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A Thought Experiment:
Imagine that you are beige. Everyone you know is beige, and everyone from
the highest positions of power to the lowest depths of squalor, is beige. A
directive comes down from the Supreme Ruler, mandating that everyone
choose a color for compulsory skin tinting. What color would you choose?
What meaning, if any, would you attach to skin color in those
circumstances? When the tinting process has been completed, must a color
hierarchy begin to emerge?
L Introduction
In his supremely influential work A Theory of Justice,' John Rawls
identifies the "original position," in which all actors are behind a "veil of
ignorance," such that no one knows what qualities, attributes, privileges, and
abilities each person might hold.z This veil of ignorance as to differences
provides the first level playing field, a vacuum even, from which all can
discuss and debate issues of fairness and justice without any influence of self
interest or self preservation. 3 Rawls posits that certain principles of justice
would emerge from this position, and that those principles are eminently
fair.4
There is a nascent debate on the fairness of race conscious financial
aid, scholarships and other targeted financial resources available to students
of color in institutions of higher learning. In Grutter v. Bollinger,5 the
United States Supreme Court determined that diversity is a compelling
interest in education, which can justify race conscious university and law
school admissions, and the Court identified some parameters for evaluating
I JOHN RAWLS, A THEORY OF JUSTICE (1971).
2 See id. at 136-37 (explaining the assumption behind the original position is that the "parties
are situated behind a veil of ignorance" where they "do not know certain kinds of particular facts").
3 See id. at 139 (stating that because "no one knows his situation in society nor his natural assets,
... no one is in a position to tailor principles to his advantage").
4 See id. at 12 (stating "the fundamental agreements reached in [the original position] are fair").
5 Grutter v. Bollinger, 539 U.S. 306 (2003) (finding that the University of Michigan Law
School's race conscience admission policy did not violate the Equal Protection Clause). In Grutter, the
Court considered an affirmative action plan used by the University of Michigan Law School. Id. at 315.
Rather than using strict quotas, the school used an individualized approach by looking at the entire
applicant and considering diversity as a factor. Id. The Court found that the school had a compelling
interest in the educational benefits which would accompany diversity, and found that the plan was
narrowly tailored to this goal. Id. at 343.
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whether such a program is sufficiently narrowly tailored to satisfy the
Grutter version of strict scrutiny.6 Yet since Grutter, the debate persists in
the financial aid aspect of university policies. Questions remain regarding
whether universities can or should continue to use race conscious financial
aid programs, scholarships and other financial assistance in efforts to foster,
promote and maintain the diversity that now constitutes an acceptable
pedagogical interest. For example, the Office of Civil Rights of the
Department of Education (OCR) has begun investigating universities who
maintain race conscious scholarship programs with circumscribed
guidelines.7 Other organizations, such as the Pacific Legal Foundation, have
threatened litigation if race conscious programs are not voluntarily
discontinued.8 Many universities have succumbed to this pressure in the
interests of avoiding conflicts with the Title VI federal funding requirements
that provide some justification for curtailing or limiting race conscious
scholarship programs.9 While race conscious admissions programs are
justified using diversity as a compelling interest, is there some fundamental
difference that renders the pursuit of such programs unfair in the financial
aid context?
This Article examines the inherent fairness of race conscious
financial aid and scholarship programs within the analytical framework set
forth by John Rawls. It considers the extent to which these policies would be
6 See id. at 334 (finding that a narrowly tailored program may not use a quota system but may
consider race as a positive factor in reviewing an application).
7 See, e.g., U.S. DEP'T OF EDUC., OFFICE OF CIVIL RIGHTS, ACHIEVING DIVERSITY: RACE-
NEUTRAL ALTERNATIVES IN AMERICAN EDUCATION (2004) (outlining guidelines for several race-neutral
alternatives in financial aid).
8 See, e.g., PacificLegal.org, Ending Preferences, https://www.pacificlegal.org/
?mvcTask=topic&id=3 (last visited July 17, 2007) (explaining the organization's Operation End Bias,
which uses litigation to stop California from using racial preferences in employment and education) (on
file with the Washington and Lee Journal of Civil Rights and Social Justice); see also JONATHAN ALGER,
NATIONAL Ass'N OF COLLEGE AND UNIVERSITY ATTORNEYS, RACE-CONSCIOUS FINANCIAL AID AFrER
THE UNIVERSITY OF MICHIGAN DECISIONS (2004), available at http://www.nacua.org/
nacualert/memberversion/RaceConsciousFinAid/RaceConscious FinancialAidWord3.doc (describing
factors that institutions who wish to maintain race conscious financial aid must follow in order to pass
constitutional muster).
9 See, e.g., Kendra Hamilton, Truth and Consequences: In the Michigan Aftermath, the Real
Fight Begins as Local Institutions Work to Apply the Supreme Court's Ruling to Meet Their Campuses'
Individual Needs and/or Restrictions, BLACK ISSUES IN HIGHER EDUCATION, Sept. 25, 2003, at 1 (stating
that numerous institutions, including Princeton, Massachusetts Institute of Technology, Iowa State
University, University of Virginia, and University of Delaware all phased out race-conscious programs or
opened them up to all students following the Supreme Court's decision in Grutter v. Bollinger); Jeffrey
Salingo, The Broad Reach of the Michigan Cases, THE CHRONICLE OF HIGHER EDUCATION, Jan. 31,
2003, at 21 (noting that Rice University also discarded racial preferences in financial aid, only to see a
remarkable decrease in the number of minority applicants. In the first year the university instituted the
changes, the number of African-American students in the first year class dropped by 46%, while the
number of Hispanic students dropped by 22%).
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considered fair by rational actors in the "original position," which John
Rawls used as a launching point for a discussion of justice and fairness.
Section II of this Article provides an overview of Rawls' theories of
justice and fairness and identifies two corollaries on financial aid in higher
education that would emerge from the original position behind the veil of
ignorance. The first corollary relies upon the equality of opportunity notion
of the traditional "need-based" financial aid rule and posits that it would be
"just" to give those who need financial assistance to enroll in higher
education whatever financial assistance they need. This section explains
why the traditional merit rule would not be the preferred standard and
explores alternative conceptions of merit. The second corollary
contemplates that regardless of financial need, those groups underrepresented
in higher education are entitled to additional assistance as well and further
proposes that the additional assistance can take many forms, not the least of
which is financial.
Section 111 of the Article examines how the two corollaries meet the
standards of existing civil rights laws, including the Department of
Education's guidelines on financial assistance; the Podberesky ° decision of
the Fourth Circuit, which provided a test for analyzing race based
scholarship programs in 1994; and the Grutter and Gratz1" cases on diversity
as a compelling interest in higher education. This section also considers the
extent to which discrimination currently exists in some financial aid and
scholarship policies and practices and examines how any such current
discrimination can be remedied using race conscious measures. The section
concludes with a discussion of the acceptable parameters and the limitations
of the diversity rationale in this context.
Section IV recommends a specific Diversity Scholarship Program
with a Critical Mass Scholarship component, which would provide a stronger
mechanism for achieving and maintaining racial and ethnic diversity in
10 Podberesky v. Kirwan, 38 F.3d 147 (4th Cir. 1994) (finding that the University failed to show
that its programs were narrowly tailored to meet its objectives). In Podberesky, the court considered the
merit-based scholarship program established only for African American students at University of
Maryland at College Park. Id. at 151. Podberesky challenged this scholarship program because he was
ineligible for consideration under the program because he was Hispanic even though he met all other
requirements for consideration. Id. at 152. The court examined the University's goals and found that the
scholarship program was not narrowly tailored to accomplish its objectives. Id. at 161.
1 Gratz v. Bollinger, 539 U.S. 244 (2003) (finding that the point system used by the University
of Michigan violated the Equal Protection Clause). In Gratz, plaintiffs challenged the University of
Michigan's undergraduate admissions program. Id. at 257-58. Using a point system, the program gave
20 points to racial minorities. Id. at 257. The Court found that the program was not narrowly tailored to
achieve the goal of diversity and found that it violated the Equal Protection clause. Id. at 276.
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higher education. This section also examines the narrow tailoring factors
from Grutter, Podberesky and other authorities, to demonstrate how this
particular scholarship program not only would satisfy the Grutter version of
strict scrutiny but also could survive a challenge presented to the current
Supreme Court roster. The Article concludes by summarizing how the
Diversity Scholarship Program complies with Rawls' theories of justice and
fairness.
II. John Rawls' Theory of Justice and the Corollaries That Likely Would
Emerge
A. A Brief Synopsis of Rawls' Theory of Justice
John Rawls' influential work, A Theory of Justice, provides useful
tools for analyzing the permissible parameters of race conscious financial aid
programs in a post-Grutter world. His conception of the "original position"
is a hypothetical situation, which he defines as the "appropriate initial status
quo." 12 Rawls assumes an original equality of persons in this pre-existence
state of being.' 3  From this position of equality behind the "veil of
ignorance," the parties discuss and debate principles of justice. 14 This veil
"ensures that no one is advantaged or disadvantaged in the choice of
principles by the outcome of natural chance or the contingency of social
circumstances."' 5  Rawls postulates that "the fundamental agreements
reached in [the original position] are fair."'16 From this original position,
Rawls suggests that two principles of justice necessarily would emerge.
The first principle of justice that would result is that "each person
has equal rights to the most extensive basic liberty compatible with similar
liberty for others."'17 Rawls' second principle of justice states that "social
and economic inequalities are to be arranged so that they are both (a)
reasonably expected to be to everyone's advantage, and (b) attached to
positions and offices open to all."'18 This theory relies upon "serial order,"
12 RAWLS, supra note 1, at 12.
13 See id. ("Among the essential features of this situation is that no one knows his place in
society, his class position or social status, nor does any one know his fortune in the distribution of natural
assets and abilities, his intelligence, strength, and the like. I shall even assume that the parties do not
know their conceptions of the good or their special psychological propensities.").
14 Id.
15 Id.
16 Id. "Since all are similarly situated and no one is able to design principles to favor his
particular consideration, the principles of justice are the result of a fair agreement or bargain." Id.
17 Id. at 60.
18 Id.
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with "the first principle prior to the second," he states.' 9 "This ordering
means that a departure from the institutions of equal liberty required by the
first principle cannot be justified by, or compensated for, greater social and
economic advantage., 20  Thus, equal rights to the most extensive yet
compatible basic liberty must always be that first goal. Nevertheless, there
will be social and economic inequalities resulting from an equal right to
basic liberty due to the "unequal faculties" of men.21 For instance, if all
persons are free to engage in commerce, those who are better at selling
goods, or making deals, eventually may end up with more money and higher
social status. Social and economic inequalities result from equal liberties
because the input (innate or learned talent or skill) is unequal. For this
reason, the second principle is necessary to help guide the inevitable
situation of inequality.22
In analyzing the second principle, Rawls explains that "there is no
injustice in the greater benefits earned by a few provided that the situation of
persons not so fortunate is thereby improved., 23  In fleshing out the
definitions of the phrases "everyone's advantage" and "open to all," he
refines the second principle to reflect that the social and economic
inequalities must be "(a) to the greatest benefit of the least advantaged and
(b) attached to offices and positions open to all under conditions of fair
equality of opportunity. 1
24
B. What Would Be the Original Position on Financial Aid and Scholarships?
If we begin from Rawls' "original position," would the same
principles of justice specifically apply to financial aid and scholarship
allocations for underrepresented groups? Some commentators have
suggested that Rawls has no applicability to questions such as this because
his theory addresses "fair institutional structures, not the fairness of
19 id. at 61.
20 Id.
21 See THE FEDERALIST No. 10 (James Madison) 78 (New American Library, 1961) (stating "the
protection of these [unequal] faculties is the first object of government").
22 RAWLS, supra note 1, at 63 (explaining the "serial ordering or the principles" does not "permit
exchanges between basic liberties and economic and social gain"). "The general conception of justice
imposes no restrictions on what sort of inequalities are permissible; it only requires that everyone's
position be improved." Id. at 62.
23 Id. at 15.
24 Id. at 83.
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individual distributional choices. ''25  Others suggest that individuality is a
central concern for Rawls.26 One scholar suggests that "Rawls framework is
particularly a propos for analyzing the claims of affirmative action
opponents." 27  He notes the following: "[The] claim is that race
consciousness violates a fundamental understanding of equality and justice.
Rawls provides us with a mechanism for evaluating that claim."
28
Rawls provides some clear examples of individual conduct in the
fairness calculation, which suggest that his theory does apply to some
individual conduct. For instance, Rawls explains how to ensure that an
individual divides a cake equally: tell him that he must divide the cake into
twelve slices, and that he will receive the twelfth slice after everyone else has
selected his or her own.29 In this situation, any bigger pieces mean some
pieces will be smaller, and assuming everyone likes cake, the smallest piece
will be the last one left.3° If our cake cutter likes cake, "he will divide the
cake equally, since in this way he assures for himself the largest share
possible. 31 If he makes any piece that is less than 1/ 12 th of the whole, that is
surely the piece that will be left for him.
Panagia likely would disagree with this application of Rawls' theory,
explaining it is just as likely that under the veil of ignorance "lurk both the
25 Vicki Been, What's Fairness got to do with it? Environmental Justice and the Siting of Locally
Undesirable Land Uses, 78 CORNELL L. REv. 1001, 1048 (1993); see also Giancarlo Panagia, Tot Capita
Tot Sententiae: An Extension or Misapplication of Rawlsian Justice, 110 PENN. ST. L. REv. 283, 284,
287-300 and accompanying notes (2005) (discussing Rawls' definition of justice and applying it to "the
world of environmental injustice created in the poor and minority neighborhoods of our nation").
26 See Guy-Uriel E. Charles, From Brown to Grutter: Affirmative Action and Higher Education
in the South, "Affirmative Acton and Colorblindness from the Original Position", 78 TuL. L. REv. 2009,
2023 (2004). Charles explains:
At first glance, Rawls' theory appears to be profoundly individualistic. He notes that
'[e]ach person possesses an inviolability founded on justice that even the welfare of
society as a whole cannot override.' Justice, Rawls instructs us, does not allow the few
to subsidize the welfare of the many. Consequently, Rawls's [sic] theory is a very
rights-oriented theory. Individuals possess certain basic political rights that cannot be
curtailed. However, Rawls's theory is not completely individualistic. Rawls maintains
that although 'justice as fairness begins by taking the persons in the original position as
individuals, or more accurately as continuing strands, this is no obstacle to explicating
the higher-order moral sentiments that serve to bind a community of persons together.'
Rawls notes that the 'primary subject of the principles of social justice is the basic
structure of society, the arrangement of major social institutions into one scheme of
cooperation.' Thus, it is social institutions that are the aim of the principles of justice.
Id. at 2023-24 (quoting RAWLS, supra note 1, at 3-4, 54, 55).
27 Id. at 2027.
28 Id.
29 RAWLS, supra note 1, at 85.
30 Id.
31 Id.
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danger of a free-for-all and a tragedy of the commons" in which rational
actors would gamble on ending up better off, and therefore might choose an
unequal distribution that does not maximize the position of the least well
off.32  Under Panagia's view, the cake cutter may choose an uneven
distribution of cake, gambling that someone either will not notice, or does
not like cake as much and will choose the smallest piece.
Professor Mar Matsuda has an interesting critique, explaining that
"[g]iven the limited knowledge Rawls would attribute to deliberators in the
original position, their choice does seem inevitable. 3 3 Matsuda continues:
"This inevitability, however, arises from the very abstraction Rawls created.
It is not a separate truth. '34 In fact, Matsuda posits that the reason one
common conception of justice emerges from behind the veil of ignorance is
simply that "[t]here is really only one person on the abstract side of the veil
of ignorance, because everyone there has the same limited information."
35
Matsuda's objection is that: "[U]navoidably the person behind the veil is
John Rawls. Abstraction never achieves the clarity of vision that Rawls
promises. 3 6 Instead, the critique continues, Rawls has concocted a theory
based on assumptions that are so constricted that they cannot explain
normative behavior.37
While no one can provide a definite answer to the question of which
principles would be considered just in the original position under the veil of
ignorance, if we proceed from Rawls' assumption that equality is a more
rational choice under the veil of ignorance, then the cake cutter analogy
holds true. Shifting from cake to education, if none of the actors knew what
her academic aptitude, abilities, or interests would be, and if none of the
actors knew what her financial resources, wealth, economic class and level of
frugality would be, two corollaries or refinements of Rawls' second principle
likely would emerge.
32 See Panagia, supra note 25, at 287 and accompanying notes (internal citations and footnotes
omitted) (explaining Rawls' "biggest misconception ... is the drive of each representative").
33 Mari J. Matsuda, Liberal Jurisprudence and Abstracted Visions of Human Nature: A Feminist
Critique of Rawls' Theory of Justice, 16 N.M. L. REV. 613, 616 (1986).
34 Id.
35 Id. at 617.
36 Id.
37 Id.
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C. The First Corollary
So let us examine the first corollary, by assuming Rawls is correct in
stating that under the veil of ignorance, without knowing one's abilities,
aptitudes and propensities, one's interest would simply be to maximize the
position in which one may end. Because that position may be the worst
position, one's incentive is to maximize the lot of the worst or least well off
in society. Applying this summary to the area of higher education, the least
well off could be any of the following: (a) those that do not have the
intelligence, (b) those that do not have the financial resources, or (c) those
that do not have the interest, to pursue higher education. A rational actor,
who may not have the intelligence to pursue higher education, would shy
away from a traditional merit based system. Someone else may not have the
interest, and so our rational actor likely would shy away from any sort of
mandatory education program. Others may not have the financial resources,
and thus our rational actor likely would avoid a program where access to
education was contingent upon ability to pay.
This rational actor likely would embrace a program that provided
financial assistance to those who needed it. This is the basis for the first
corollary: that it would be "just" to provide financial assistance for those
who need financial assistance to enroll in higher education. Providing need
based financial aid, such that those with the most need get the most aid,
satisfies the first clause of Rawls' revised formulation of the second principle
as an economic inequality that provides the greatest benefit to the least
(financially or economically) advantaged; therefore, it is a corollary that is
likely to emerge.
Does this corollary satisfy the fairness principle? It is fair to give
more money to those who need it to attend school and to decline to give
money to those who have sufficient financial resources to attend school
because, in Rawls' view, "there is no injustice in the greater benefits earned
by a few provided that the situation of persons not so fortunate is thereby
improved." 38 Here, those not so fortunate in terms of financial resources
would be improved by permitting them to pursue the goal of obtaining higher
education. One commentator agrees, stating: "[a] simple Rawlsian criterion
might give compensatory resources to those who are least advantaged even if
that ran into problems of individual abilities, interests, and motivation,
38 RAWLS, supra note 1, at 15.
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leading back to individual characteristics and optimal individual behavior.
39
Those who were more fortunate in terms of finances would not be harmed
because they can use their own money to afford college if that is the choice
that they want to make, assuming they have the interest and aptitude as well.
In fact, many schools operate on this principle already in their allocations of
financial aid subsidies, though there is significant variance in the price
students actually pay, depending on the wealth and ranking of the
educational institution.40  Thus, on balance, a need-based financial aid rule
satisfies the fairness principle.
39 Gordon Winston, Economic Stratification and Hierarchy Among U.S. Colleges and
Universities, at Williams College, Nov. 2000, DP No. 58, at 26. The author states:
[T]he average student attending a top decile private college gets a subsidy of almost
$24,000 a year while the average student in a school at the bottom of the private sector
gets about $3,000. It is significant, too, that the range of subsidy differentials is much
narrower in the public than in the private sector, perhaps predictably. Students in the
top decile in the private sector get a subsidy that's almost eight times that given in the
bottom public decile; students in the top public decile get a subsidy that's a bit less than
three times that given in the bottom decile.
Id. at 7. Later, he states: "Indeed that, probably, is the most dramatic single measure of disparity in
Table 1: that the student going to-to take the extremes-a top decile public institution pays twelve cents
for a dollar's worth of educational resources while the student going to a bottom decile private school
pays 71 cents." Id. at 9.
40 Catharine Hill, Gordon Winston, and Stephanie Boyd, Affordability: Family Incomes and Net
Prices at Highly Selective Private Colleges and Universities, at Williams College, Jan. 2004, No. 66r. The
authors state:
Affordability, then, is judged by the net price (net tuition) that students actually pay for
a year of college, relative to their family incomes. It's been popular in the press to
report schools' sticker prices-the maximum price they charge-relative to US median
family income, implying that a family at that level will spend a significant fraction of its
total income to send one child to college--66% at the typical school in this study. But
that's highly misleading because a student from a median income family won't pay the
sticker price at a school with need-based financial aid-his average net price at these
selective schools in 2001-02, in fact, was $11,556, which is just 34% of their average
sticker price and 23% of the US median family income.
Id. at 4 (emphasis in original).
Our data, then allow us to compare the price each student actually paid, net of financial
aid grant, with his family's income. So, on the one hand, we can report the net prices
paid by low income students and how they compare with their families' incomes and,
on the other, we can describe schools' pricing policies across the range of family
incomes as the prices charged their students differ for different incomes.
Id. The study notes that the "least severe increase in income share with rising income is at the coed
colleges, but even there, low income students pay 36% of their family incomes, on average, while lower-
middle income students pay 22% and that share persists to the highest incomes." Id. at 15. The authors
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D. What About Traditional Notions of Merit for Financial Aid Allocations?
Why would the rational actor avoid the traditional notions of merit as
a criterion for awarding financial aid? While some commentators would
suggest that the rational actor may choose to gamble,41 it is more likely that
she would hedge her bets in the same way that the cake cutter did. Because
that actor would not know her place in terms of intelligence, she would want
to maximize the opportunity available to the last in line. Thus, she would
want to expand the traditional conception of merit to include a variety of
skills, talents and abilities, to put her in the best possible position once she
learns what talents she will possess.
On the issue of merit and preferences, Ronald Turner describes a
bake sale protesting affirmative action policies where white male students
were charged a dollar for a donut, with the price dropping a quarter for
women, another quarter for Latinos and another quarter for African
Americans.42 The point of the story was to illustrate "the resentment and
anger felt by many opponents of affirmative action" when others get benefits
seemingly without any regard for their individual merits.43 Another point of
the story is more subtle: those who cannot afford to pay a dollar for the
donut should get the donut for less, but how much one can afford is not
solely, or even closely, based on race or ethnicity or gender."4
If we evaluate the bake sale from a financial aid perspective, it
suggests that students of color pay less for the same good-the benefits that
also note that the "most direct effect of wealth on pricing, then, is simply that the wealthier school can set
a lower average net price and, other things being equal, offer the lowest prices to its low income students.
That's the direct connection between institutional wealth and net price." Id. at 18. Winston also notes:
"It's interesting-to return to the fact noted above-that there appears to have been a rather Rawlsian
protection of students at the bottom of the public sector hierarchy during the tax revolt of the '80s as their
subsidies were kept high and their price/cost rations were kept low." Winston, supra note 39, at 26.
41 See Panagia, supra note 25, at 287 and accompanying text (positing that Rawls' theory of an
emergent egalitarian social contract from behind the veil of ignorance fails to account for the possibility
that the rational actors could gamble on the likelihood of their own success and therefore choose to
maximize the income of the richest members of society rather than distribute wealth equitably).
42 See Ronald Turner, The Too-Many-Minorities and Racegoating Dynamics of the Anti-
Affirmative-Action Position: From Bakke to Grutter and Beyond, 30 HASTINGS CONST. L.Q. 445, 506-07
(2003) and notes 298-300 (relating an anecdote about a controversial bake sale on the campus of Southern
Methodist University, meant to illuminate the divisive nature of affirmative action, where the price of
baked goods was determined by the race and sex of the customer).
43 Id. at 507 and accompanying notes.
44 Although, on average, women earn less than men, and people of color earn less than Anglos
when working in the same positions, so perhaps there is some more principled basis for this price
difference, which would be beyond the scope of this article.
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flow from a diverse student body-for which the Anglo students pay more.45
The bake sale also recognizes the explicit but inaccurate dichotomy in race
conscious aid-that those for whom race is not a component of the selection
criteria often are considered to be more "deserving" than those for whom
race is such a component.
1. Merit Aid Diminishes Diversity
Many schools and more than a dozen states have merit-based
financial aid programs, which have resulted in a shift of funds away from
poor and minority students towards more affluent white students.46 Orfield
explains that when the money for education is "from an extremely regressive
tax-a state lottery that drew money disproportionately from poor and
minority players-blacks and Latinos would end up paying a substantial part
of the cost of educating more affluent white students, who would have gone
to college even if they had not had the additional financial incentive ."
47
Orfield articulates several reasons why need based aid is preferable
to merit based aid for those interested in preserving access to higher
education for people of color. Primarily, financial aid is a way to "make
certain that we do not decide access to college on the basis of family income
and wealth.,
48
A second reason to prefer need based aid over merit based aid is
commonly stated as "the students with the highest scores and grades are
usually from better-off families and are most likely to go to college without
any aid.",49  "Furthermore," he states, "the 'neutral' measures of merit are
45 A polarizing argument can be made that the Anglos contribute less to the benefits that flow
from a diverse student body, and absorb more from those benefits, and therefore their increased
consumption of the good justifies the higher price they must pay.
46 GARY ORFIELD, Foreword, in WHO SHOULD WE HELP? THE NEGATIVE SOCIAL
CONSEQUENCES OF MERIT AID SCHOLARSHIPS, xi (Donald E. Heller & Patricia Marin, eds., 2002).
47 Id. at xi.
48 Id. at xii. Orfield continues:
[i]n a society where all the growth of income goes to those with education beyond high
school and equal access to education is the only tool we have for making things fair, we
have to make college possible for all who can benefit. Otherwise, we may lock in
inequality from generation to generation and perpetuate the kinds of deeply rooted class
structures that have troubled older societies. In our society, of course, these structures
would tend to perpetuate racial inequality as well.
Id.
49 Id.
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actually very strongly related to unequal family background. ' 50 The third
reason is the rise in tuition costs compared to family income over the past
two decades. 51  For these reasons, as more fully described in the report
through an analysis of various merit aid programs, Orfield concludes: "[i]t is
clear that many of the goals of these programs, especially those that involve
increasing access to college, are not being met. Instead, these programs are
increasing already existing inequities in higher education."'5 2 He continues:
"[a]s brought to light by these studies, merit aid programs are, at best, not
meeting their promises. At their worst, they are locking an increasing
number of students out of college." 53
In her contribution to Orfield's report titled Merit Scholarships and
the Outlook for Equal Opportunity in Higher Education, Patricia Main
explains:
[T]he twelve states that have broad-based merit scholarship programs
with no income cap awarded a combined $863 million in merit awards
during the 2000-01 academic year, almost three times the $308 million
these stated provided in need-based aid. Unfortunately, because of the
definitions of 'merit' employed, as well as the logistics of these
programs, many of the students who have the greatest financial need
are passed over, effectively increasing existing disparities in college
participation for minority and low-income students.54
Main concludes, "the students least likely to be awarded a merit
scholarship come from populations that have traditionally been
underrepresented in higher education. ' 55  Marin admits that more
information is needed.56  She recognizes that colleges and universities are
50 Id.
51 Id.
52 Id. at xiii.
53 Id.
5 Patricia Matin, Merit Scholarships and the Outlook for Equal Opportunity in Higher
Education, in WHO SHOULD WE HELP? THE NEGATIVE SOCIAL CONSEQUENCES OF MERIT AID
SCHOLARSHIPS, 111, 113 (Donald E. Heller & Patricia Main, eds. 2002).
55 Id. at 114.
56 Id. She explains that:
[W]e need to know more about these effects. While these studies increase our
understanding about the merit aid programs examined, additional research is needed on
specific student populations a well as other state merit aid programs not included in this
report. The reality of higher education is that there is not room for ill-conceived policies
that do more harm than good, no matter how popular they may be. The future of our
youth, and ultimately our society, is at stake. Policies must focus on expanding access
and developing the talent of all our future citizens. This means that policymakers must
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aware of the importance of valuing various criteria in deciding to admit
applicants.57  Such criteria include high school record, extra-curricular
activities, teacher recommendations, essays and test scores.5 In this way,
she suggests, a range of criteria should be used in giving merit scholarships.59
The reliance on merit aid not only results in a disparity between high
and low income students but also in racial stratification as well. The Harvard
Civil Rights Project report also evaluated programs in Florida and
Michigan. 6° The authors note that:
[S]ignificant achievement gaps between white and Asian American
students on one hand, and Hispanic and African American students on
the other, and between high SES students and low SES students, have
been identified. These gaps persist regardless of what specific learning
outcome is measured, or whether the analysis is conducted at the level
of individual students within schools or at the level of the schools
themselves.
61
In studying scholarship award distributions, this study confirmed
Orfield's point that more scholarships "are going to students in high schools
with higher college-participation rates (before implementation of the merit
scholarship programs)., 62  Thus, the authors conclude that merit-based
scholarships are likely to have a lesser impact on college access as compared
to need-based scholarships.63
Another chapter in this report reached a similar conclusion: that
students given merit-based scholarships are unlikely to be members of
take additional factors into consideration in using funds that are going to merit aid
programs.
Id. (emphasis in original).
57 Id. at 115.
58 Id.
59 Id. at 115-16.
60 Donald E. Heller, & Christopher J. Rasmussen, Merit Scholarships and College Access:
Evidence from Florida and Michigan, in WHO SHOULD WE HELP? THE NEGATIVE SOCIAL
CONSEQUENCES OF MERIT AID SCHOLARSHIPS, 25, 27 (Donald E. Heller & Patricia Marin, eds. 2002).
61 Id. at 30.
62 Id. at 33.
63 Id.; see also Susan Dynarski, Race, Income and the Impact of Merit Aid, in WHO SHOULD WE
HELP? THE NEGATIVE SOCIAL CONSEQUENCES OF MERIT AID SCHOLARSHIPS, 73, 87 (Donald E. Heller &
Patricia Marin, eds. 2002) (asking whether merit aid widens racial and economic gaps in college
attendance or whether the peculiarities of the Georgia program to blame for this effect). She answers that
"the many low-income youth who were not eligible for HOPE [merit scholarships in Georgia] would have
seen their schooling costs increase, since they faced increases in tuition prices and cuts in grants but
received no countervailing benefit from the program." Id. (emphasis in original).
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populations who have been underrepresented in higher education. 64 The
authors explained that:
As these [merit] programs crowd out need-based scholarship programs,
which traditionally have focused their awards on students who required
financial assistance to attend college, it is likely that college access
among lower income students will suffer. Merit scholarship programs
are likely to exacerbate, rather than help remedy, college enrollment
gaps in the United States.
65
The gap in enrollment can be directly addressed through the second
corollary as described in Section E, infra.66
2. Even Among the Elite Universities, Merit Based Aid Diminishes Diversity.
Through the 1980s, The Overlap Group was a financial aid
consortium of the Ivy league schools, seven sister colleges, Amherst,
Williams, MIT and a few others, who had an agreement to cooperate on
need-based financial aid guidelines.67 William Bowen, the former President
of Princeton, had testified that low income students would suffer if the
cooperation was prohibited, and then diversity would diminish as a result.
Nevertheless, the Department of Justice filed a lawsuit, accusing the Overlap
of operating an illegal cartel. The other defendants settled, and MIT took the
case to trial. Roger Banks, of Harvard's Admissions office, explains that
"the climate is now riddled with suspicion." 68 The article goes on to state:
"[c]learly the academic need rule was being eroded by consideration of
academic merit as well as racial consideration. Yet all the institutions
involved persisted in their denials that financial aid awards were based on
decisions other than academic need.,
69
All of this means less aid for the less "meritorious," and less aid for
the more needy, which can result in less diversity. Perhaps the Ivy League
Schools will begin to offer merit based scholarships now that the Overlap
can no longer meet to conform financial aid awards to students admitted to
64 Heller & Rasmussen, supra note 60, at 35.
65 Id.
66 See White v. Engler, 188 F. Supp. 2d 730 (E.D. Mich. 2001) (challenging the legality of racial
disparities in scholarship awards in Michigan).
67 The New Bidding War for High-Scoring Students Causes Selective Colleges to Be Less
Diverse, J. OF BLACKS IN HIGHER EDUC., No. 30, 15-16 (Winter 2000-2001) [hereinafter New Bidding
War.
68 id. at 16.
69 Id.
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more than one Ivy league school. According to Jim Tilton, Yale's director of
undergraduate financial aid:
[R]ecent differences between financial aid offers to students accepted at
Yale and at other Ivy schools suggest that the price wars the old system
was designed to avoid may already be at hand. 'Some of the packages
I've seen weren't based on need but on merit.' He says flatly. 'Things
have changed in the Ivy group.'
70
Another article notes that since the discontinuation of Ivy Overlap in
the early 1990s, significantly fewer students of color have enrolled at
previously participating schools.71 Another study reveals an interesting twist
on merit and need based aid in the aftermath of the Overlap group meetings,
finding that before the antitrust lawsuit, "100 points on the verbal SAT
generated an increase in grants of 303 dollars" while "after the antitrust
action, 100 points on the verbal SAT generated 884 dollars in grant
money. '72 Hoxby also notes that "need calculation became slightly more
generous for students with higher scores. 7 3  One article describes the
conclusions of Professor Hoxby's study as follows:
[T]he amount of aid available to poor students remained about the
same. At the same time, the amount of aid available to middle- and
upper-middle class students grew substantially. Since the halt of the
Overlap meetings, tuition revenues have continued to rise. Thus it is
clear that the schools were enrolling more students who were able to
pay all or part of their comprehensive fees.
74
The article further describes Professor Hoxby's ultimate conclusion as
follows:
70 Marc Wortman, Can Need-Blind Survive, YALE ALUMNI MAGAZINE, Oct. 1993, available at
www.yalealumnimagazine.com/issues/93-10/admissions.html.
71 Elbert L. Robertson, Antitrust as Anti-Civil Rights? Reflections on Judge Higgenbotham's
Perspective on the "Strange" Case of United States v. Brown University, 20 YALE LAW & POL'Y REVIEW
399, 423 (2002).
72 Caroline M. Hoxby, Benevolent colluders? The Effects of Antitrust Action on College
Financial Aid and Tuition 33 (Nat'l Bureau of Econ. Research, Working Paper No. 7754, 2000),
http://www.nber.orglpapers/w7754 (on file with the Washington and Lee Journal of Civil Rights and
Social Justice).
73 Id. at 34.
74 New Bidding War, supra note 67,at 16.
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[I]f the trend continues, the number of poor students who are able to
attend these elite schools will decrease significantly. According to
Hoxby, these schools may continue to admit just as many blacks as
they have in the recent past. But these students are more likely to be
middle-class blacks from suburbia rather than African Americans from
the rural South or from low-income families in the inner city.
7 5
This increase in generosity suggests that merit is playing a role in
financial aid determinations among the "Overlap" colleges, which include
Ivy League schools.7 6  At the same time, the rate of increase of Latino and
African American representation slowed, though an increase still was
noted.77
Nevertheless, some colleges are holding fast to the policy of not
awarding merit-based awards. 78 Rawlings, as president of Cornell, chaired a
group of presidents from 28 leading colleges, who:
[R]eaffirmed their commitment to provide financial aid based on
financial need and endorsed a comprehensive set of principles for the
fair determination of a family's contribution to the cost of securing an
undergraduate education. The group decided: most fundamental of
these principles is that financial need should be the principal
determinant of institutional aid awards.
79
75 Id.
76 See Wortman, supra note 70 (stating that "Merit scholarships may not be limited to non-Ivy
schools for long," and quoting financial aid officers' allegations that some financial aid packages offered
to students from other Ivy League schools appear to be based on merit, rather than need, given the
financial information submitted by the applicant to both Ivy league schools).
77 Hoxby, supra note 72, at 35.
78 See Rawlings-Led Group Affirms Commitment To Need-Based Financial Aid, CORNELL
CHRONICLE, July 12, 2001, at 1, available at http://www.news.comell.edu/chronicle
/01/7. 12.01/568_aid.html (describing the commitment of 28 leading colleges and universities to making
need-based, rather than merit-based financial aid determinations).
79 Id. at 1. The article goes on to say:
In 1994, Congress created an antitrust exemption (Section 568 of the Improving
American's Schools Act) that sanctioned efforts by eligible institutions, i.e., those
practicing need-blind admissions, to discuss and agree upon common principles of
financial aid need- analysis. In enacting Section 568, Congress recognized the value of
need-based aid and the fact that students will benefit from colleges and universities
working together to develop policies that enhance access to higher education. In early
1999, the 568 Presidents' Working Group, an ad hoc group of college and university
presidents, was formed under the umbrella of this general legislation. These presidents
share a belief in the primacy of need-based financial aid, and a common concern about
the steady erosion of public confidence in a financial aid system that aspires to be both
understandable and fair. All of their institutions practice need-blind admissions. The
group, formed initially under the leadership of Rawlings, who continues as its chair, and
then-President Harry Payne of Williams College, limited the purview of its work to
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The federal government may provide an incentive for universities to
abide by a need-based rule. Federal financial aid guidelines encourage (how
strongly we need to determine) universities to adhere to a requirement that
any student receiving federal aid must receive only need-based, and not merit
aid.8° Professor Hoxby writes:
It is worth noting that the federal government encourages colleges to
use need-based aid by dictating that any student who receives one
dollar of federal aid must only receive need-based aid. This rule
effectively puts a tax on any college that make[s] extensive use of merit
aid even though the population of students it serves is somewhat
needy.
81
To the extent that the need-based rule continues to be widely used,
diversity will not diminish as much as under the traditional merit rule.
However, because many consider merit to be the fairest way to allocate
scarce educational resources in the affirmative action debate, it is worth
exploring how alternative views of merit can satisfy the principles of justice.
E. Alternative Conceptions of Merit and the Second Corollary
In the Grutter case, the University of Michigan addressed the issue
of pursuing both excellence and diversity, arguing that an either/or choice
82was no choice at all. The Court agreed that the University's academic
freedom permitted it to strive to achieve both excellence and diversity.83
Similarly, allocating too much financial aid assistance into merit-based aid
and away from need-based aid may erode that quality of diversity and
excellence that elite universities such as Michigan wish to continue to
achieve. So the next question becomes: can we define merit in a way that
does not diminish socio-economic and racial diversity?
strengthening need-based aid programs. Their recommendations are designed to bring
greater clarity, simplicity and fairness to the process of assessing each family's ability to
pay for college.
Id.
so See generally, Hoxby, supra note 72.
81 Hoxby, supra note 72, at 9.
82 Brief for Respondents at 13, Grutter v. Bollinger, 539 U.S. 306 (2003) (No. 02-241);
University of Michigan Brief, 2003 U.S. S. Ct. Briefs LEXIS 157 at 13.
83 Grutter, 539 U.S. at 309.
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If we return to the "original position" with a rational actor beneath
the "veil of ignorance, ',8 4 that actor likely would choose as broad a chance as
possible for being included in the distribution of educational resources.
Thus, she would embrace a notion of merit that includes all types of talents
and skills, thereby maximizing her chances of possessing one of whatever
talents happened to be favored. Now, one could say that she would deny a
merit-based rule altogether, regardless of how broadly merit was to be
defined, in the interest of preserving the widest possibility for qualifying in
case she had no talents or skills at all. However, elite institutions will find a
way to distinguish applicants, and thus it is unlikely that a no-merit rule
would survive for long.
In effect, universities have always provided differential pricing to
attract the different types of students that they want to enroll in their
schools. Some of the most sought after types of students include: those
who will be good in the classroom, those who will be illustrious or wealthy
alumnae, students who look good in the brochures, those they want for the
orchestral or drama programs, and athletes to take their teams to victory.
Academic scholarships are simply another way to get good students to attend
one school instead of another.86 Athletic scholarships are simply another
way to get students who are great athletes to attend one school instead of
another.8 7 Need-based aid is simply another way to get students who are less
wealthy to attend one school instead of another. Race-based scholarships are
simply another way to provide a financial incentive for students of color to
attend one school, instead of another. Thus, every bit of scholarship and
financial aid is about diversity in one form or another, and the broader the
definition of diversity, the more inclusive these financial assistance policies
can be.
1. Merit as Value, Not Dessert
The story of the bake sale, from Section D above, has broader
implications for race-based scholarships and financial aid, especially when
we revise the hypothetical to be more descriptive of reality. The question is
8 See generally, RAWLS, supra note 1.
85 See Hill et al., supra note 40, at 2-3 (considering charitable pricing implicit in need-based
grants); see also Thomas J. Graca, Diversity-Conscious Financial Aid After Grutter and Gratz, 34 J.L. &
EDUC. 519, 522-25 (2005) (discussing how colleges and universities employ cost-benefit analysis to
discount their tuition and fees based on their motivation to retain prospective students).
86 See Graca, supra note 85, at 522 (explaining that merit-based scholarships are often based on a
school's need for a diversely-talented student body).
87 Id.
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not how much each person pays for a donut, but rather, how much each
person (representing a graduate school, for instance), is willing to pay for a
particular type of donut. If your school has an abundance of cream-filled
donuts, you may not want any more, even though they are still your favorite.
As a result, your school may buy more cream-filled donuts only if they are
inexpensive, and you have some room left for them. On the other hand, the
chocolate cake donuts with chocolate icing are the ones every school wants,
so you are willing to pay more for that kind of donut. Since the cream-filled
donuts still are your favorite, the best tasting donuts in your view, then you
will resume buying the cream-filled donuts if the chocolate donuts get too
expensive. The cream-filled donuts are no more "deserving" of purchase, and
the chocolate donuts are no less "deserving" of purchase. It is all a matter of
taste and preference. In much the same way, universities can, and do, set
their "price points" for the students they want to enroll based in part on taste
and preference.88
Maurice Dyson explains an alternative view of merit as "value,"
which permits diversity factors to be considered for the value to the
university as well. 89 He states that:
The notion of 'merit' as one's demonstrated ability or achievement is
but one basis for judicial deference to a university-driven mission
where the value of diversity is an alternative, but legitimate, aim. As
opposed to merit, the notion of 'value' in this context signifies a sense
of worth in usefulness or importance to the university.
90
88 The donut analogy bears out in the way need-based financial aid dollars are allocated, because
schools with more income from wealthier students can afford to pay more (in scholarship aid) to non-
wealthy students. As an illustration of how universities allocate financial aid dollars, Hill, Winston &
Boyd note:
In the extreme, a school with only a few low and lower-middle income students can
afford to be very generous to them, giving them low net prices, while a school with a
higher proportion of low income students could be so generous only at a higher cost. A
high share of high income students cuts the cost of a progressive pricing policy not so
much by providing more revenues, but more importantly by reducing the draw by low
income students on limited non-tuition resources.
Hill et al., supra note 40, at 19.
89 See Maurice Dyson, Towards an Establishment Clause Theory of Race-Based Allocation:
Administering Race-Conscious Financial Aid after Grutter and Zelman, 14 S. CAL. INTERDISc. L.J. 237,
261 (2005) (noting how universities value diversity in their admissions and financial aid determinations).
90 id. at 261.
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Dyson then explains that, to the extent that "the intrinsic conception
of merit exists entirely in the domain of individual capacity to leverage
academic ability or achievement, it is an incomplete picture." 91 If we re-
conceptualize merit to include adding value to the educational institution,
then all financial aid and scholarships become "merit-based," or conversely,
even merit aid will be considered "value-based" instead.
Author Thomas Graca also suggests this step.92 Graca begins by
identifying a crucial difference between the way students perceive merit
aid-as rewards for their academic achievements in the past-with how
colleges perceive merit aid-for self-interested reasons, as an inducement for
students with particular skills, talents and attributes to attend one university
over some other.93 For universities, strong athletes increase the likelihood of
championships, as well as "media and licensing rights," and strong academic
credentials "bolster" the universities' reputations. 94 Graca summarizes the
bottom line as follows: "Merit-based financial aid is awarded not to reward
the past achievements of prospective students. Instead, institutions of higher
education award merit-based financial aid in exchange for a benefit that the
university anticipates receiving in return. 05 Based on this reasoning, athletic
scholarships, which many universities offer, already constitute a form of
"merit aid."
Thus, Graca concludes that "because all of an institution's 'merit-
based' aid is in fact based on value rather than merit, it can only follow that
the value of diversity is as worthy a value as any other., 96 Diversity can
include immutable characteristics such as race and ethnicity, characteristics
that students have little control over, such as religion, family history,
adversities overcome and SES status, and purely mutable characteristics,
such as developed skills and expertise, extra-curricular and occupational
91 Id. He continues:
For when we say there is an extrinsic value to diversity, we are essentially saying that
value is always relative to the utility and significance any given candidate brings to the
table. But even here, the distinction collapses very often in the admissions context. It
does so also in the context of financial aid decisions where the value of an applicant to
a college or university determines whether and to what extent a prospective candidate
may receive merit-based aid. There is still little in the way of a definitive entitlement.
Id.
92 See Graca, supra note 85, at 523-34 (explaining that "merit-based" financial aid is based not
on an applicant's intrinsic "merits," but rather their external "value" to an institution of higher education).
93 Id. at 521-23.
94 Id. at 522-23.
95 Id. at 523.
96 Id. at 524.
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experiences, languages, and other factors. A defensible diversity plan should
be designed in a way that:
[A]ll applicants have the capacity to have had unique experiences that
would allow them to contribute to the diversity of an institution's
student body. So, an appropriate diversity-conscious financial aid
structure doesn't do undue harm to disfavored groups because everyone
has the potential to be a part of the favored group(s).97
When all of these factors are considered for diversity scholarships
and financial aid, the program will be more likely to satisfy the narrow
tailoring factors to justify some consciousness of race in financial aid
considerations to further the compelling interest in diversity of all types.
2. Increasing Value by Diversifying
The second corollary is not quite self-evident but logically emerges
from the "original position" focused on financial aid.9 s Let us trace through
the argument for the second corollary. From the "veil of ignorance," 99 our
rational actor does not know whether she will feel comfortable in the
environment of higher education (or elite higher education to make the point
more clearly). Some people will be part of the majority, and others will be
part of the various minority factions. Because of the veil of ignorance, our
rational actor does not know into which category she will fall. This
uncertainty will lead her, like the cake slicer, to divide up the "good" of
education, equally, to ensure that the last piece left over is as big as possible.
Hence, the second corollary would state that the greatest benefits should go
to groups underrepresented in higher education. If one were to consider the
open door of admission to constitute "fair equality of opportunity," then
pursuing diversity can continue, using just inequalities, based on the first
clause of the original version of Rawls' second principle, that social and
economic inequalities are permissible if "reasonably expected to be to
everyone's advantage'' ° Rawls' second principle of justice, as described
above, states: "Social and economic inequalities are to be arranged so that
they are both (a) reasonably expected to be to everyone's advantage, and (b)
97 Id. at 529.
98 Supra notes 7-16 and accompanying text.
99 Id.
100 RAWLS, supra note 1, at 60
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attached to positions and offices open to all."'ll The United States Supreme
Court has declared that "the benefits that flow from a diverse student body"
are real, and important enough to constitute a compelling government
interest, an interest that can justify a race-conscious admissions program.
0 2
The existence of a diverse student body, and particularly a critical mass of
students from the various diverse groups, provides benefits to students of all
colors, regardless of a particular students' level of contribution to that
diversity. All students benefit from a diverse learning environment.
10 3
Therefore, the inequality that results from diversity-enhancing programs
inures to "everyone's advantage," and thus satisfies the second principle of
justice as a "just" inequality.
Additional incentives, like outreach and retention programs, simply
will be another inequality that fosters diversity to everyone's advantage, and
therefore will be just and justified. These additional benefits also can be
financial. Thus, equality of opportunity, the starting point for Rawls, could
give way to equality of access, or equality of attendance, and the arguments
for these points as they relate to financing higher education are explored
below.
Admittedly the rationale for the second corollary extends farther than
Rawls suggested, or perhaps even intended, because it assumes that there is
some "good" or benefit to advanced education. Rawls does not seek to
assign the "good" in his original position and, in fact, suggests that it does
not matter what the good is.'1 4 Even if one does not know what is "good," he
posits that these principles will govern the division of whatever is later
determined to be good when the veil is lifted and positions are assigned. 1
05
Thus, the inequalities that must exist among educational
opportunities would be considered "just" according to Rawls, if those who
received the better education used it for the betterment of society, which can
be shown by helping the least fortunate members of that society.1°6 This
101 Id.
102 Grutter, 539 U.S. at 343.
103 Id. at 330; see also Brief for Amicus Curiae 65 Leading Businesses in Support of Respondent,
Grutter v. Bollinger, 539 U.S. 306 (2003) (No. 02-241), 2003 WL 399056, *1 (explaining that employers
have an interest in hiring employees who have experienced diversity in their educational backgrounds);
Brief of the Society of American Law Teachers as Amicus Curiae in Support of Respondents, Grutter v.
Bollinger, 539 U.S. 306 (2003) (No. 02-241), 2003 U.S S. Ct. Briefs LEXIS 215, *19 (noting the increase
in "cultural capital" among those with diverse social contacts); and Brief of American Law Deans
Association as Amicus Curiae in Support of Respondents, Grutter v. Bollinger, 539 U.S. 306 (2003) (No.
02-241), 2003 U.S. S. Ct. Briefs LEXIS 221, *6 (arguing that diversity in education enriches the
perspective and experience of the student body as a whole).
104 RAWLS, supra note 1, at 12.
105 Id.
106 /d. at 100-01.
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understanding has interesting ramifications for financial aid allocations.
Still, as public institutions lessen diversity funding, those students in the
bottom decile receive less aid in terms of subsidies, and thus they pay more
as a percentage of family income for their education. Benefiting the least
well-off is being done through admissions, but not through financial aid.
10 7
Nevertheless, to the extent that merit plus social good is the new
measuring stick for financial aid, however, the underrepresented may obtain
some benefit (for those who are more interested in returning to serve their
communities of color after school or graduate school), but the benefit will
not give a boost to enough of the underrepresented to change their status.
For instance, UCLA School of law performed an experiment with a public
interest program to capture students who fulfill this type of merit-plus
qualification level.10 8  This author was a member of the committee that
selected students for admission to the program and was somewhat surprised
by the results. In the aftermath of SP-1 and SP-2,1°9 and Proposition 209,110
there were very few applicants of color, and even fewer who met the GPA
and LSAT criteria to be considered for admission to this program at UCLA
law."' Thus, the "merit plus social good" standard did not produce a racial
and ethnically diverse student population.
3. Maximizing Under-represented Groups
Rawls' discussion of the second principle provides additional
support for the second corollary on under-representation. That second
principle recognizes that some inequality is bound to occur." 2 Rawls defines
107 The benefit then can become illusory, but this takes us back to the need based aid issue
discussed in Section D above.
108 See Gary Blasi, Creating a Program in Public Interest Law & Poly at a Public Law School, in
EDUCATING FOR JUSTICE: SOCIAL VALUES & LEGAL EDUCATION, 107, 107-28 (Jeremy Cooper & Louise
Trubek, eds., 1997) (describing the UCLA Law admissions program, its goals, results and
accomplishments in the early years).
109 See The Regents of the University of California, Policy Ensuring Equal Treatment:
Admissions (SP-1) (July 20, 1995), available at http:// www.berkeley.edu/news/berkeleyan/
1995/0830/text.html (banning preferences based on race, ethnicity, or gender in the University admissions
decisions); The Regents of the University of California, Policy Ensuring Equal Treatment: Employment
and Contracting (SP-2) (July 20, 2995), available at http:// www.berkeley.edu/news/berkeleyan/
1995/0830/text.html (banning preferences based on race, ethnicity, or gender in the University's
employment and contracting processes).
110 See CAL. CONST. ar. I, § 31 (2007); see also Blasi, supra note 108, at 113 (describing
Proposition 209, or the California Civil Rights Initiative as legislation which prohibits the consideration of
"race or gender in admissions decisions ").
I Blasi, supra note 108, at 107-28.
112 RAwLS, supra note 1, at 100-02.
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injustice as "inequalities that are not to the benefit of all," and the benefit of
all includes raising up the least advantaged, as discussed above.' 13 Thus, the
first corollary's inequality of providing need-based financial aid benefits to
the least advantaged and will be a "just" inequality. 14 Similarly, providing
additional support for those who are underrepresented will be a "just"
inequality because it lifts up the least advantaged to increase their
representation in higher education.
This theory provides a justification for racial and ethnic affirmative
action, but how does that lead to race conscious financial aid? The simplistic
answer is that students from underrepresented groups are being admitted to
the elite institutions, yet remain underrepresented in those elite institutions,
and thus something more must be done. Some are precluded by financial
resources, and the need-based projections assist some, but not all in this
category. Others have not developed the interest in elite education, and still
others have not developed the aptitude to compete for enrollment at the most
elite institutions.
Regardless of the reasons, the social and economic inequality that
results from under-education "does not provide the greatest benefit to the
least advantaged," and while it is "attached to positions and offices open to
all, "that openness is not under conditions of "fair equality of opportunity."
Thus, "under-education" or under-representation in elite and semi-elite
educational institutions is not a "just inequality;" under-representation is an
"unjust inequality." The most meritorious under this conception of justice
would be those who are least represented, and the principles of justice are not
being realized as to those among us. Financial incentives are one way to
address the fairness of the so-called equal opportunity. For instance, current
mechanisms for evaluating SES and financial need are not an adequate or
accurate reflection of a family's ability to afford the price tag for higher
education, because they do not consider wealth, inherited wealth, net worth
and real property holdings (or do so in a way that hides the severe
differences in wealth among admitted students).115
3 Id. at 62, 83.
114 Another author has suggested an alternative conception that Rawls would tolerate under-
representation as long as the least advantaged benefits from that under-representation. "A less simplistic
Rawlsian critique criterion would tolerate initial disparities, favoring the highly talented and energetic so
long as their productivity eventually served the least advantaged. Indeed, Lehman's objections to the
winners in the present system could be seen as deriving from an inadequate trickle down to the less
fortunate members of society" Id. Winston, supra note 39, at 26. In conclusion, the author notes:
Winston's response seems to still consider the traditional notion of merit, with a minor expansion to
include those who intend to do good work on behalf of others, or on behalf and for the benefit of, society.
Id.
115 See William C. Kidder, In The Rise of the Testocracy [sic]: An Essay on the LSAT,
Conventional Wisdom, and the Dismantling of Diversity, 9 TEX. J. WOMEN & L. 167, 184 (2000) ("Since
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For this reason, what seems to be above the level of need-based aid,
may in fact be necessary aid for the student to actually be able to afford to
attend the school. How many middle class and upper middle class students
(by current SES standards) are precluded from attending their first choice
schools because the financial aid package was inadequate, despite being
based on a formula that is supposed to be fair and provide financing
opportunities to all to the extent that they need it? 116
Outreach and retention programs are other ways to address the
fairness of equal opportunity. In much the same way that merely unchaining
the hobbles at the starting line does not give a "fair equality of opportunity"
to the runner," 7 opening the door to admission at institutions of higher
learning does not give a "fair equality of opportunity" to the matriculating
student. Without fairness at the entry level, the resulting inequalities are
unjust. For these reasons, the second corollary requires maximizing
underrepresented groups. After evaluating the legality of these corollaries
under existing law, this Article then presents a blueprint for a Diversity and
Critical Mass Scholarship Program.
III. Would These Corollaries Satisfy Existing
Anti-Discrimination Laws?
The United States Supreme Court has not ruled specifically on the
parameters of race-conscious financial aid and scholarships. While the
number of students affected by such aid is not great, the policy is important
to understand in the context of the continuing evolution of equal protection
doctrine. As of 1993, the year before the Podberesky decision, the number
of students affected by race-conscious scholarships was small with only less
than a thousand out of 45,000 programs using race as a sole criterion.' 18 This
parental wealth-and not parental educational attainment, income or occupational status-is the best
predictor of children's wealth, leaving net worth out of a SES index can significantly underreport the SES
differences associated with racial/ethnic group membership."). Furthermore, Kidder states: "[W]ithin
each ethnic group, students from upper-SES backgrounds had higher LSAT scores than those with upper-
middle-SES backgrounds; and so on." Id. at 185.
116 One discrepancy in the formula arises because SES is not based simply on wealth. Wealth is
simply one measure that goes into determining SES. Other measures that are used to determine SES
include education, income and the make-up of the neighborhood.
117 Lyndon Johnson, President of the United States, Commencement Address at Howard
University (June 1965), http://www.lbjlib.utexas.edu /johnson/archives.hom/speeches.honV650604.asp
(on file with the Washington and Lee Journal of Civil Rights and Social Justice).
11 See Kara Pate, The Legality of Race-Exclusive Scholarship, 2 KAN. J. L. & PUB. POL'Y 91, 91
(1993) ("It has been estimated that any alteration of the current policy could affect as many as 45,000
scholarships targeted for students of a particular race or national origin. Another source estimates that
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number has diminished significantly in the past decade." 9 Still, the issue is a
potent political one, and there are two important legal authorities to consider:
(1) the Podberesky decision of the Fourth Circuit;12 and (2) the Department
of Education (DOE) Guidelines as revised in part based on the Podberesky
decision.
1 2'
A. Podberesky v. Kirwan
In Podberesky, the Fourth Circuit addressed the issue of race-
conscious financial aid and scholarship programs. 122 The Podberesky court
evaluated the University's argument that its Banneker scholarship program
was narrowly tailored to "remedy the present effects of past
discrimination."' t23  The court considered "whether the program actually
furthers a different object from the one it is claimed to remedy."'124 The court
rejected the University's contention that its goal to attract high achieving
African American students would be sufficient to justify sustaining the
program because those high achievers were not the "group against which the
university discriminated in the past."'125 At the time of this decision in 1994,
remedying past discrimination was the only certain compelling interest for
race-based programs because the diversity rationale still was in dispute. 126
Another criticism of the Banneker scholarship program was that
applicants who were not residents of the state of Maryland were permitted to
apply for the scholarship. This reality conflicted with the actual expressed
goal of increasing the number of qualified African American Maryland
residents who attend the school. 127 The court further criticized the reference
pool relied upon by the district court in its analysis of the under-
4,404 scholarship programs use minority status as one of several factors in awarding financial aid
amounting to approximately $131.8 million. Race is the sole criterion of eligibility, however, in only an
estimated 742 programs serving about 3,000 students.").
119 See Hamilton, supra note 9, at 1 (stating that despite race-conscious admissions being upheld
in the Michigan law school decision, there has been a decrease in race-conscious programs in higher
education institutions).
120 Podberesky v. Kirwan, 38 F.3d 147, 161 (4th Cir. 1994).
121 Nondiscrimination in Federally Assisted Programs, 59 Fed. Reg. 8756 (Dep't of Educ. Feb. 23,
1994) [hereinafter DOE Guidelines].
122 Podberesky, 38 F.3d at 147.
123 Id. at 158.
124 Id.
125 Id.
126 See Adarand Constructors, Inc. v. Pena, 515 U.S. 200 (1995) (stating that remedying past
discrimination is a compelling state interest).
127 See Podberesky, 38 F.3d at 159 ("[l]t is obvious that awarding Banneker Scholarships to non-
residents of Maryland is not narrowly tailored to correcting the condition that the University argues, that
not enough qualified African-American Maryland residents attend at College Park.").
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representation of African Americans at the school. 128 The court reasoned:
"the reference pool must factor out, to the extent practicable, all nontrivial,
non-race-based disparities in order to permit an inference that such, if any,
racial considerations contribute to the remaining disparity. This the District
Court simply has not done." 129 The court concluded: "we are thus of the
opinion that, as analyzed by the district court, the program more resembles
outright racial balancing than a tailored remedy program. As such, it is not
narrowly tailored to remedy past discrimination. In fact, it is not tailored at
all.
,, 130
The Podberesky court also found there was little, if any, connection
between lower retention rates of African American students and the race-
conscious scholarship program, despite evidence that some students work
and live off campus with long commutes, which contributes to their attrition
rates. 131 The court determined that "if there is some connection between the
two, the university has not made any attempt to show that it has tried without
success, any race-neutral solutions to the retention problem. Thus, the
university's choice of a race-exclusive merit scholarship program as a
remedy cannot be sustained."'132 The court held that the Banneker program
violated both the Equal Protection Clause and Title VI of the Civil Rights
Act of 1964.133
After Podberesky, various states took steps to address the race-based
scholarship issue.' 34 For instance, the Colorado Attorney General guidelines
128 See id. (describing the reference pool as arbitrary because it neglected to account for "eligible
African-American high school graduates who either (1) chose not to go to any college; (2) chose to apply
only to out-of-state colleges; (3) chose to postpone application to a four-year institution; (4) voluntarily
limited their admission applications to Maryland's predominantly African-American institutions").
129 Id. at 160.
130 Id.
131 See id. at 161 ("The causes of the low retention rates submitted both by Podberesky and the
University and found by the district court have little, if anything, to do with the Banneker Program.").
132 Id. at 161.
133 See Burt M. Fealing, Race-Based Scholarships-Podberesky v. Kirwan, 38 F.3d 147 (4th Cir.
1994), 12 HARV. BLACKLEITER L.J. 177, 183 (1995) ("Although the court in Podberesky has created a
somewhat difficult standard for race-based scholarships to overcome in order to survive strict scrutiny
analysis.., this does not necessarily mean that public institutions of higher education are prohibited from
using financial resources to combat hostile racial attitudes on campus through increased racial
diversification. There are various options institutions such as UMCP [University of Maryland at College
Park] can pursue to overcome negative racial perceptions which can often lead to the under representation
of minorities while simultaneously conforming to judicial mandates.").
134 See Amy Weir, Should Higher Education Race-Based Financial Aid Be Distinguished from
Race-Based Admissions?, 42 B.C. L. REV. 967, 978 (2001) (describing the steps taken by several states to
confront the race-based scholarship issue).
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stated that race-conscious scholarships no longer should be provided.' 35 In
Texas, an order to stop offering such scholarships was later rescinded in the
absence of a "clear national standard."'136 Oregon put "tighter restriction on
race-based tuition waivers." 137 And the University of Washington announced
the private funding of a new program with substantial resources to assist
underrepresented minority students.' 38  Some Michigan colleges and
universities used race-based scholarships when they did not use race as a
factor for admissions. 1
39
B. The Department of Education Policy Guidance and Remedies for Past
Discrimination
In the aftermath of Podberesky, the DOE issued a policy guidance to
clarify some uncertainty in the permissible uses of race-conscious financial
aid. 140
Principle 3 permits using financial aid to remedy past discrimination. 14' No
formal finding is required as long as the university is prepared to
demonstrate to a court that "there is a strong basis in evidence for concluding
that the college's action was necessary to remedy the effects of its past
discrimination."' 142 If this baseline is established, a university may use
unrestricted funds as well as restricted donor funds in these remedial
efforts. 143 The question then becomes how broadly the department defines
its own past discrimination. The easy case involves schools that were race-
exclusive in the past. Those schools are obvious past perpetrators of
discrimination. But, how can current financial aid policies be a means of
remedying the effects of that discrimination? One might suggest that the
current policies would be a sort of atonement for past sins,' 44 which could be
135 See id. at 978 ("The Colorado Attorney General, for example, issued guidelines to that state's
twenty-eight public colleges that they should no longer provide race-specific scholarships, nor should they
select students to receive such scholarships from outside sources.").
136 Id.
137 Id
03s See id. at 978 and accompanying notes ("In October 2000, the University of Washington
announced a $65.6 million program aimed at providing financial aid to underrepresented minority
students.").
139 See id. at 978 (stating that at least two Michigan colleges continue offering race-based
scholarships even though neither school has used race for admissions purposes).
140 See generally, DOE Guidelines, supra note 121.
141 Id. at 8757.
142 Id.
143 Id.
144 See Kathleen M. Sullivan, Sins of Discrimination: Last Term's Affirmative Action Cases, 100
HARV. L. REV. 78, 95-96 (1985) ("The problem with sin as the predicate for affirmative action is thus that
it keeps alive protests about windfalls to nonvictims and injustice to innocents.").
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a necessity in the process of remediation. However, the use of race-specific
financial assistance in the year 2007 will not be narrowly tailored because
the specific victims-those who were denied admission solely because of
their race-are not being helped by the current financial aid awards. Thus,
the race-based financial aid policy will fail to satisfy the DOE guidelines,
Podberesky, and most importantly, strict scrutiny.
In criticizing the use of race-based scholarships justified on remedial
grounds, one author indicates that "universities that offer minority-exclusive
scholarships without specifically identifying the discriminatory effect the
scholarships are designed to eliminate would be vulnerable to summary
judgment because the program will not be narrowly tailored. Equally as
important, if a court cannot determine whether the remedy bears a close
relationship to the present effects of prior discrimination, then the program
will likely be destined to fail the narrowly tailoring requirement." 145 He also
discusses the Flannigan146 case against Georgetown where the court found
that a policy "which awarded sixty percent of the available financial aid to
the eleven percent of the students who were racial minorities violated the
nondiscrimination provisions of Title VI." 
47
To meet the narrowly tailored requirement for race-based financial
aid policies and to preserve race-conscious financial aid policies, a university
could pursue a path that links the past discrimination to current remedial
efforts. One way to ensure the requisite close link is by considering current,
instead of past, discriminatory practices. To the extent that a university
currently is perpetrating racial discrimination in some way, immediately
ceasing that practice and providing a remedy for it should satisfy the close fit
between means and end. If the remedy is otherwise narrowly tailored, then it
may survive a legal challenge and strict judicial scrutiny. Several areas
where universities may be engaging in current racial and ethnic
discrimination are discussed below.
145 Kirk A. Kennedy, Race-Exclusive Scholarships: Constitutional Vel Non, 30 WAKE FOREST L.
REV. 759, 779 (1995).
146 See Flanagan v. President and Directors of Georgetown College, 417 F. Supp. 377, 384
(D.D.C. 1976) (concluding that Georgetown and the Law Center were required to refrain from
discriminating on the basis of race when they accepted federal financial assistance for the construction of
the Law Center). In Flanagan, a student brought a civil rights suit against the university, alleging racial
discrimination in award of financial assistance to students of federally funded legal center. Id. at 378.
The district court of the District of Columbia found that the evidence that showed that sixty percent of the
available financial aid was awarded to eleven percent of the students who were racial minorities was
sufficient to show the university's liability for discriminatory action, but that evidence was insufficient to
determine damages. Id. at 385.
147 Kennedy, supra note 145, at 784.
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1. Remedying Current SAT and AP Discrimination
Universities are understandably uncomfortable with admitting to any
current racial discrimination, in this more enlightened era, but there are
several areas that could be a good starting point for a critical self-analysis by
university general counsels' offices who wish to justify race-conscious
financial aid programs on remedial grounds. For instance, universities can
begin with the SAT and high school Grade Point Average (GPA). There is
evidence that the SAT has a racial bias.148 While there is much debate over
the existence and extent of any racial bias in the SAT, 149 when schools
continue to use the SAT as a dominant factor in assigning indices for
admission, students are being admitted in part based on what some perceive
to be a discriminatory means. Similarly, most colleges consider high school
GPA in their admissions decisions and award additional points for certain
scores in Advanced Placement (AP) courses. Many high schools track
students into and out of AP courses, based in part on their race or ethnicity,
and many schools with larger percentages of students of color also have a
smaller percentage of AP courses to offer to those students.1 50 Thus, GPAs
and the indices associated with them are assigned in a process that
incorporates some racial discrimination. Many universities then offer
additional financial incentives to students with high indices based on their
combined SAT and enhanced GPA numbers. The aid arguably is awarded
on a discriminatory basis.
This is not to suggest that all consideration of the SAT scores and
high school grades that provide extra points for AP classes is discrimination
14 See, e.g., Roy 0. Freedle, Correcting the SAT's Racial and Social Class Bias: A Method for
Re-estimating SAT Scores, 72 HARv. ED. REV. 3 (2002) ("The SAT has been shown to be both culturally
and statistically biased against African Americans, Hispanic Americans, and Asian Americans.").
149 See id. at l(discussing the search for an equitable ethnic representation in colleges over the
past several decades). Freedle and Kostin, cognitive psychologists, used a measure called the Differential
Item Function (DIF) to study ethnic bias on standardized tests. Id. at 3. Their research showed that
"Whites students tend to score better on easy items and African-Americans on hard items." Id. A bias is
created, in part, because the SAT scores each item with equal weight, whether easy or hard. Id. at 4.
Further, there is evidence of an "unintended but persistent cultural and statistical bias" in the verbal
section of the SAT that adversely affects African Americans. Id at 3. As a result of this bias, scores of
non-white students are negatively affected. Id.
150 See Jeanne Oakes, Director of UCLA's Institute for Democracy, Education & Access, Address
at The Education Exchange (Nov. 21, 2003), http://www.idea.gseis.ucla.edu/projects/ejc/download.html
(showing that in schools where African-American and Latino students comprised more than 70% of the
population, the average number of AP courses offered was 3.8, whereas in schools where African-
American students and Latino students comprised less than 30% of the population, the average number of
AP courses offered was 5.3) (on file with the Washington and Lee Journal of Civil Rights and Social
Justice).
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or is wrong. There is no dispute that the SAT and high school GPA indices
are based at some level on academic aptitude, but we need to consider
whether that method also has racial implications that might amount to more
than disparate impact discrimination.'5'
If the universities are therefore awarding financial aid and
scholarships on a discriminatory basis, then halting that oblique
discrimination would be the starting point. Next, each university can craft a
remedy for its own immediately past discrimination. That remedy can
include race-conscious financial aid and scholarship awards. While the fit
would be a close one, and the means would seem to be an appropriate one,
the tougher analysis is in the under-and over-inclusiveness of the remedy, as
well as its duration. How long does one need to provide race-conscious
merit aid to remedy past racial discrimination in the award of merit aid? In
the first few years of the remedial program, the actual victims of past
discrimination in this area can be helped by the remedy if they are still
students enrolled at the university. After a few years, though, all those who
were awarded aid for at least one year under the previous (arguably
discriminatory) system would have graduated, or otherwise left the school,
and therefore would not benefit from the remedial measure.
At this point, the fit would be less close, and the duration of the
program may be limited. Although there is no requirement that the only
beneficiaries be actual victims of that university's own past discrimination to
satisfy the narrowly tailored requirement, the more attenuated the link, the
less likely the program will continue to pass constitutional scrutiny.
2. Remedying Current Faculty Offspring Scholarship Discrimination
Financial aid for faculty children is another avenue that the general
counsels' offices should pursue to ferret out potentially racially
discriminatory policies. First, one must gather the statistics on the diversity
levels of the faculty at various points over the university's history, and then
analyze the percentage of faculty children who have received aid. If
statistics are available on the race or ethnicity of the faculty children, then it
would be easier to determine how much of the financial aid set aside for
151 For instance, is there a colorable claim that the heavy reliance on these two factors that have a
racially disparate impact at some level constitutes intentional discrimination to the extent that these
policies are adopted in part "because" they keep "less qualified" minority applicants from ever being
offered "merit scholarships" or merit financial aid? Other researchers have addressed these questions,
which are beyond the scope of this article.
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faculty offspring is being awarded to students of color. The easy case would
find non-actionable disparate impact discrimination, but an argument can be
made that past intentional discrimination against people of color for faculty
positions resulted from recruiting standards and policies that were designed
to preserve or increase the university's prestige at the expense of otherwise
qualified applicants of color. If that recruiting standard artificially limited
the pool of qualified faculty of color, then it would in turn also shrink the
available pool of faculty offspring of color who would be eligible for the
special scholarships and financial aid.
The final step in remedying this problem involves increasing
scholarship funds for which students of color could compete. It may be more
difficult to define the eligible class of students in a way that avoids under-
and over-inclusiveness. One way is to ensure a proper fit between the means
and the end is to limit the scholarships to offspring of professors who applied
for and were denied employment at the particular educational institution.
This would be a very small group for most universities, and thus both the
burdens and benefits of this program would be marginal.
3. Remedying Current Legacy/Alumnae Offspring Discrimination
A similar rationale applies to financial aid for "alumnae offspring,"
also known as legacies. If, in the past, the university discriminated in
admissions against applicants of color, that action decreased the pool of
alumnae of color. Having fewer alumnae of color also decreased the pool of
"offspring of alumnae of color" who would be eligible to receive special
legacy scholarships and financial aid. In admissions, the legacy preference
"works largely to the benefit of whites, [and] in Bowen and Bok's study,
legacy preferences had a sizable effect on admission rates within the SAT
intervals where black-white gaps in admission rates were largest." 152 Legacy
preferences likely have an important effect on financial aid decisions as well.
Decreasing the legacy preference for admissions would have an adverse
effect on universities because alumnae expect a bit of a preference for their
offspring. 153 However, as children of alumnae generally are more affluent
152 Goodwin Lui, The Causation Fallacy, 100 MICH. L. REV. 1045, 1069 (2002).
153 See Jack Greenberg, Affirmative Action in Higher Education: Confronting the Condition and
Theory, 43 B.C. L. REV. 521, 537 (2002) ("For example, when Columbia, in the 1960s, eliminated
preference for legacies, alumni contributions fell drastically. Columbia soon returned to the prior policy.
This tilt in favor of alumni, who attended school when few or no blacks did, is also a tilt towards
whiteness, and will continue to be until the children of affirmative action students start applying in
substantial numbers.").
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than other categories of admitted students, revising any legacy preference for
financial aid would have a less deleterious effect.
154
Each of these current programs could be discriminating on a racial or
ethnic basis and could provide a justification for remedial race-conscious
financial aid. The next question to explore is whether Rawls' theory allows
for this kind of remedy. Without knowing which race one will belong to and
which race will be favored and which will not, most rational actors in the
original position under the veil of ignorance would not select as a corollary
to the second principle that a particular race or ethnicity be favored or
disfavored, and thus a race-specific rule for financial aid determinations
would not emerge from beneath the veil of ignorance. Instead, equality
based on race would be the "just" expectation and inequalities based on race
would not be considered just because such inequalities would violate the first
principle of the most extensive liberty consistent with a similar liberty for
others. 5 5 However, the remedial aid could be justified in a different way
under Rawls' theory. When the members of a particular under-represented
racial group are the least advantaged, providing financial aid for them
specifically would be permitted as a justified inequality because it raises the
level of the least among us. Thus, the aid would not be based on race, but
rather on under-representation and the second corollary and would be
considered fair on that basis.
The diversity rationale fits more readily within Rawls' Theory of
Justice and may provide a more palatable justification for race-conscious
financial aid, and so to that issue we now turn.
C. The Department of Education Policy Guidance and Principle Four:
Diversity, and Narrow Tailoring
In 1994, the DOE amended Principle Four to provide details on the
permissible parameters of race-conscious financial aid and scholarship
programs in the midst of the diversity debate and the controversy over the
Podberesky case. The Policy Guidance in Principle Four allows the use of
154 See Wortman, supra note 70, at 4-5 ("According to admissions officers, another factor should
be added to the equation. Despite the highest admissions rate of any single bloc of candidates, fewer
children of alumni now attend the College than in the past. . . . But whatever the reason, there is a
financial implication, because alumni children typically come from families with substantially higher
incomes than the rest of the population."); see also Kidder, supra note 115, at 184 (stating that parental
wealth is the best predictor of children's wealth).
155 See Charles, supra note 26, at 2027-35 (arguing that colorblindness would not be the rule that
would emerge from the original position, based on the primary principle of liberty as extensive as possible
without curtailing the liberty of others).
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race if it is narrowly tailored and necessary to further an interest in diversity
without undue restrictions on aid for students who do not meet the racial
criteria. 116
The revised Principle Four permits an "award of financial aid on the
basis of race or national origin if the aid is necessary to overcome the effect
of past discrimination ... provided that the use of race or national origin is
consistent with the constitutional standards reflected in Title VI, i.e., that it is
a narrowly tailored means to achieve the goal of a diverse student body."'
157
Moreover, private gifts restricted by race or national origin can be
administered only if "that aid is consistent with the other principles in this
policy guideline."1
58
The revised Principle Four further states the following:
[A] college should have substantial discretion to weigh many factors--
including race and national origin--in its efforts to attract and retain a
student population of many different experiences, opinions,
backgrounds, and cultures--provided that the use of race or national
origin is consistent with the constitutional standards reflected in Title
VI, i.e., that it is a narrowly tailored means to achieve the goal of a
diverse student body .... When using race as a factor, it must further
the interest in diversity and also be narrowly tailored such that it is
necessary to further that interest and does not unduly restrict access to
financial aid for students who do not meet the race-based eligibility
criteria.
159
In analyzing comments to the proposed changes in the policy
document, the DOE explained that a case by case analysis for race targeted
financial aid programs will not result in the failure of all such programs to
pass constitutional and Title VI scrutiny. 160 The comments also recognize
the important differences between the financial aid decisions that do not
necessarily preclude a student from attending the college and admissions
decisions that do.
16 1
156 DOE Guidelines, supra note 121, at 8757; see also Bingham McCutchen LLP, Morrison &
Foerster, LLP, and Heller Ehrman White & McAuliffe, LLP, Preserving Diversity in Higher Education, A
Manual on Admissions Policies and Procedures After the University of Michigan Decisions, 78-80
(2004),
http://www.equaljusticesociety.org/compliancemanua/Preserving-Diversity-n-Higher-Education.pdf
(summarizing the DOE policy guidance from the Federal Register) (on file with the Washington and Lee
Journal of Civil Rights and Social Justice).
157 DOE Guidelines, supra note 121, at 8757.
158 Id.
159 Id.
160 Id. at 8761.
161 Id. at 8762.
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In considering the narrowly tailoring issue, the Policy Guidance
recommends looking at the following five factors:
(1) whether race-neutral means of achieving that goal have been or
would be ineffective; (2) whether a less extensive or intrusive use of
race or national origin in awarding financial aid as a means of
achieving that goal has been or would be ineffective; (3) whether the
use of race or national origin is of limited extent and duration and is
applied in a flexible manner; (4) whether the institution regularly
reexamines its use of race or national origin in awarding financial aid to
determine whether it is still necessary to achieve its goal; and (5)
whether the effect of the use of race or national origin on students who
are not beneficiaries of that use is sufficiently small and diffuse so as
not to create an undue burden on their opportunity to receive financial
aid.
16 2
Some Commentators reduce the Policy Guidance's narrowly tailored
requirements to four factors:
1. the state must explore possible race neutral remedies and
approved race-based remedies only when necessary; 2: a race-
based remedy must be flexible and temporary; 3. there must be
statistical correlation between the race-based remedy and the
appropriate population; and 4. the race-based remedy must not
prefer one minority to the exclusion of others.
163
Bednark also addresses the issue that there may be a contradiction in
the narrow tailoring factor that requires a temporary program or an
observable endpoint. 164 Because of the long history of discrimination and
the shorter duration of efforts to remedy that problem, that time constraint
could be considered arbitrary and therefore would not satisfy the narrowly
tailored requirement. In addition, to the extent a University did not meet the
arbitrary time frame, the program might be subject to additional scrutiny and
perhaps curtailment. 165
162 Id. at 8757.
163 B. Andrew Bednark, Preferential Treatment: The Varying Constitutionality of Private
Scholarship Preferences at Public Universities, 85 MINN. L. REv. 1391, 1399 (2001).
164 Id. at 1414.
165 See id. at 1415-16 (stating how courts will disfavor institutions that differentiate between
minority groups).
13 WASH. & LEE J.C.R. & SOC. JUST. 2 (2007)
The factor for not preferring one minority over another also seems to
foster a potential contradiction inherent in any diversity-based rationale for
race-based action. If diversity is the goal, then allowing any group to be "too
large" lessens overall diversity, and then additional members of that group
are no longer useful to the goal of maintaining diversity. Those additional
members should no longer be "preferred" if maximizing diversity remains
the articulated goal. When members of one group are no longer preferred,
and other groups retain their preferred status, is the "no preference for one
minority over another" principle being violated? Considering the specific
language of this factor, the answer is no. The group that has become "too
large" should no longer be considered a minority in the diversity equation.
Therefore, the principle of not preferring one minority group over another
minority group is not implicated. Like the other non-minority group (the
majority), sufficient representation for diversity purposes has been achieved,
and at that point, any further race or ethnicity based advantage to that group
no longer would be narrowly tailored to serve the compelling interest in
diversity. If the preference no longer is properly tailored, then it must be
discontinued.
This does not mean that all efforts toward that group must be halted.
While the recruiting efforts can be curtailed, retention efforts still should be
made to ensure that representation continues at adequate levels. When it is
time to consider applications for the next year's entering class, then the
financial aid professionals should exercise their judgment to determine
whether additional race-based aid is needed to maintain that level, or whether
some diminishing of the race based aid for that group can be accomplished
without lessening the number of enrolled students. With this system, each
group is simply being measured against itself, and no single minority group
is being preferred over another. This system also satisfies the "no undue
harm" factor that other commentators address.166 The only preference is
among inadequately represented groups in our diversity calculus.
Some creative scholarship criteria suggested by other scholars could
violate the principle of not preferring one minority group over another. If
schools are using SES diversity to help meet their actual goal of diversifying
the school on racial and ethnic grounds, those schools may be performing
intentional racial discrimination with a race neutral mechanism. Dyson
suggests that targeting scholarships around other attributes, such as people
with sickle cell anemia, or Black studies majors, would provide greater
166 See, e.g., Graca, supra note 85, at 525 (explaining that "undue harm" is one of the narrowly
tailored diversity considerations in the financial aid structure).
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diversity of African Americans without being explicitly race based. 67 Still,
it is likely that the racial intent to prefer members of a particular racial group
would exist, and thus such criteria may be criticized as an illegitimate use of
race nonetheless. Dyson notes that the DOE policy guidelines implementing
Title VI "were read to prohibit discrimination that is the result of differential
treatment, as well as that resulting from facially neutral policies and practices
that have an impermissible disparate adverse impact."' 168 The impermissible
disparate impact would be the dearth of Anglos eligible to compete for
scholarships based on sickle cell status or majoring in African American
studies.
D. The Narrowly Tailoring Factors Post-Grutter
Grutter and Gratz announced that a diverse student body is a
sufficiently compelling interest to justify some race-conscious admissions
decisions, thus adding to the previously acknowledged compelling interest of
remedying past discrimination. 69 Despite the fact that the rationale to justify
the need for race-conscious programs has expanded slightly to include
diversity issues, the narrowly tailored requirement remains a significant
hurdle for many programs; Podberesky is still the most significant precedent
case on the narrowly tailoring aspect of the strict scrutiny test in the financial
aid context. 70 Girardeau Spann surmises "Grutter might now authorize the
use of minority scholarships, such as those invalidated by the Fourth Circuit
in Podberesky v. Kirwan as a means of getting minority students actually to
attend the schools that admitted them in the hope of increasing diversity."'
' 71
Spann further recognizes, however, that "Grutter's insistence on ensuring
that all students be able to compete for all seats may be read to preclude the
use of minority scholarships . . . [because] a program cannot insulate one
category of applicants from competition with all other applicants." 1
72
167 Dyson, supra note 89, at 245-46.
16 See Id. at 246 (discussing the regulations at 34 C.F.R. Part 100 and how the regulation is
interpreted to prohibit discrimination that is the result of differential treatment).
169 Grutter v. Bollinger, 539 U.S. 306, 328 (2003); Gratz v. Bollinger, 539 U.S. 244, 275 (2003).
170 See, e.g., Eisenberg v. Montgomery County Pub. Schs., 197 F.3d '123, 128 (4th Cir. 1999)
(denouncing a school district policy on the basis that, in certain circumstances, race was the only factor
considered, despite the District Court's finding that diversity was a compelling interest); Wessmann v.
Gittens, 160 F.3d 790, 808-09 (1 st Cir. 1998) (emphasizing the need for narrowly tailoring by stating that
"noble ends cannot justify the deployment of constitutionally impermissible means").
171 Girardeau A. Spann, From Brown to Bakke to Grutter: Constitutionalizing and Defining
Racial Equality, 21 CONST. COMMENT. 221, 228 (2004).
172 Id. at 228 n.46.
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As discussed above, the DOE Policy Guidance recommends looking
at six factors when evaluating the narrowly tailored analysis. 173 In analyzing
the issue of narrow tailoring of race-conscious scholarship programs, Dyson
also articulated six "indispensable characteristics" to pass strict scrutiny
under Grutter and Gratz.174  Those factors, which race-based scholarships
must meet, are the following:
(1) individualized comparison of applicants; (2) the absence of
mechanistic formulas; (3) the goal of achieving a 'critical mass'
of underrepresented minorities; (4) doing no undue harm to
members of groups not favored by the system; (5) a continuing
exploration of race-neutral alternatives; and (6) a realistic time
limit.
175
Because these factors from the various sources described above overlap, the
section below evaluates all of the factors in relation to the scholarship
recommendation that this Article proposes.
IV. A Narrowly Tailored Scholarship Recommendation
In light of the Podberesky, Grutter, DOE, Dyson and Bednark
factors discussed above, this article recommends that universities interested
in maintaining and increasing student diversity offer "diversity scholarships."
Several public and private institutions already offer diversity scholarships,
including San Diego State University, Yale University, Penn State
University, University of Wisconsin, Colorado University, Mercer, Whitman
College, Pierce College, and Pepperdine University. These diversity
scholarships would consider all the ways that students can contribute to
diversity, including but not limited to, gender, socio-economic status, special
musical talent, artistic talent, athletic ability, and religious affiliation (at
religiously-affiliated universities).
173 See DOE Guidelines, supra note 121, at 8757 (describing the six factors as the following: "(1)
whether race-neutral means of achieving a goal have been or would be ineffective; (2) whether a less
extensive or intrusive use of race or national origin awarding financial aid as a means of achieving that
goal has been or would be ineffective; (3) whether the use of race or national origin is of limited extent
and duration and is applied in a flexible manner; (4) whether the institution regularly re-examines the use
of race or national origin and awarding financial aid to determine whether it is still necessary to achieve
its goal; and (5) whether the effective use of race or national origin on students who are not beneficiaries
of that use is sufficiently small and diffuse so as to not create an undue burden on their opportunity to
receive financial aid").
174 Dyson, supra note 89, at 250-51.
175 Id. See also Graca, supra note 85, at 525-26 (depicting the same six factors used for analyzing
narrowly tailored factors).
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One major difference between the diversity scholarships currently
offered and those recommended here is the following: high intellectual
aptitude would be another component of diversity instead of being segmented
out as "merit" or "honor" scholarships. The justification for including
traditional merit as but one component of diversity recognizes that many
universities, especially those with enforced grading curves, need students
who are high performers but also need students who perform at a lower level
of academic achievement. In addition, those schools that do not enforce a
specific grade curve still need to fill their student body with an adequate
number of tuition paying students. If these universities could do so with only
the highest achieving students, they might choose to do so. The competition
of other schools, however, means that these schools must take some students
who have less than their optimum numerical indicators. Thus, a school can
use diversity scholarships to balance out the incoming SAT averages of its
entering classes. Because the diversity scholarships would be open to all
students, these scholarships would not be race-exclusive or race-
determinative, and therefore would not trigger Grutter's strict scrutiny.
To avoid being disingenuous about what it is sought to be
accomplished-an increase in diversity, including, and perhaps even
especially, racial and ethnic diversity-this recommendation, while similar
to that made by Graca, 176 augments his proposal by adding a race-conscious
component for consideration as well. Sub-section B below analyzes how the
race-conscious component of this scholarship recommendation holds up
under the narrowly tailoring analysis.
A. Factor One: Whether a Race Neutral Alternative Has Been or Would Be
Ineffective
Diversity Scholarships could bypass strict scrutiny if the
scholarships were awarded on a race-neutral basis. To guarantee race
neutrality in the decision-making process, the selection committee would
have to forego any consideration of the applicant's race or ethnicity. Thus,
the committee could consider factors such as past obstacles students have
overcome and their ability to contribute to the classroom learning, as well as
what this applicant can contribute to a diverse learning environment. If,
however, the applicant's race or ethnicity is a factor that is considered
explicitly, then the process is no longer a race-neutral one, and the process
176 See generally Graca, supra note 85.
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must submit to the strict scrutiny analysis. It would be ironic if diversity
evolved to exclude race and ethnicity as factors, which it must if the
approach is to be a race-neutral one. To the extent that race and ethnicity are
not considered by the selection committee, then the diversity scholarships
would be easy to justify, but would they be effective in promoting all kinds
of diversity?
One article explained that "race neutral policies," such as need-blind
admissions policies and the increase in student financial budgets, have
helped to increase the diversity levels of entering classes at Brown and
Harvard, for instance. 177 That author also recognized William G. Bowen's
suggestion that:
'[T]he most 'privileged' colleges and universities . .. consider moving
beyond 'need-blind' admissions and giving a positive boost to the
admissions chances of well-qualified candidates from poor families and
from families with no college-going history.' Such a boost would be
equivalent to 'putting a 'legacy thumb' on the scale' or even
'substituting some of these candidates for recruited athletes.' 178
The types of diversity promoted here are socio-economic and we
must examine the extent to which increasing that type of diversity also
increases racial and ethnic diversity.
1. SES Factors Are Not Effective in Increasing Racial and Ethnic Diversity
Many proponents of using socio-economic status as a viable race
neutral policy to increase diversity without explicitly relying on race are
perhaps overly optimistic. As noted in a report on the modified diversity
program at UCLA School of Law in the aftermath of the Regents'
decisions, 179 and Proposition 209,180 if socio-economic status becomes an
177 See Marcia G. Synnott, The Evolving Diversity Rationale in University Admissions: From
Regents v. Bakke to the University of Michigan Cases, 90 CoRNELL L. REV. 463, 503 (2005) (explaining
some statistics on diversity and financial aid). Synnott's article was part of the symposium entitled
Revisiting Brown v. Board of Education: 50 Years of Legal and Social Debate, see id. at 503-04 and
accompanying notes 330-40 (describing that Ivy League colleges have increased student financial aids to
help students pay tuition costs).
178 See id. at 504 (quoting William G. Bowen, Grutter: Where Do We Go From Here?: The
Impact of the Supreme Court Decisions in the University of Michigan Affirmative Action Cases, J. Blacks
Higher Educ. 80 (Summer 2004)).
179 See Policy Ensuring Equal Admissions, Office of the Secretary to the University of California
Board of Regents, July 20, 1995, http://aad.english.ucsb.edu/docs/SP-l.html (stating various decisions
regarding admission criteria into the UC School system) (on file with the Washington and Lee Journal of
Civil Rights and Social Justice).
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important factor in admissions, it results in more lower-income Anglos and
Asians being admitted, rather than increasing the number of admitted African
American and Latino students.'
8 1
This discrepancy between socio-economic and racial diversity levels
is largely due to two factors. First, there are more Anglos in the nation, and
therefore more in the lower SES brackets than other groups in terms of
absolute numbers. 8 2  Also, to the extent that a significant group of Asian
applicants are from families who recently immigrated to the United States,
that group might include a higher percentage of students who also fall into
the lower SES categories.1 83  The second factor is that very few African
Americans and Latinos from low SES backgrounds meet the threshold
minimum GPA and LSAT scores to be considered for enrollment at a school
such as UCLA School of Law. 8 4 Only by significantly lowering admissions
criteria could an increase in SES diversity result in a notable increase in
racial and ethnic diversity.
Moreover, many African American students whose LSAT scores are
competitive for a law school like UCLA do not have a low SES score. 1
5
Greenberg states the following:
180 See Cal. Const. art. I, § 31 (adopting Proposition 209, which prohibits discrimination against,
and preferential treatment based on, race or ethnicity, in the area of public education).
181 See Rick Sander, Experimenting with Class-based Affirmative Action, 47 J. LEGAL EDUC. 472,
497-98 (1997) (noting that Anglos and Asian Americans both increased in their numbers among
admittees and matriculants and that those who were admitted were very likely to attend once admitted);
see also Dyson, supra note 89, at 244 and accompanying notes ("Indeed, some will claim that financial
aid grants based upon economic need, rather than race, are more suitable race-neutral alternatives. This
stance, however, fails to recognize that most studies relying on socio-economic indicators alone have
proved ineffectual in maintaining previous levels of racial diversity, and largely tend to benefit low
socioeconomic whites instead of racial minorities.").
182 Sander, supra note 181, at 497.
183 Id.
184 See Linda Wightman, The Threat to Diversity in Legal Education: An Empirical Analysis of
the Consequences of Abandoning Race as a Factor in Law School Admissions Decision, 72 N.Y.U. L.
REV. 1, 52-53 (1997) ("Evaluation of the SES data, in particular, highlights the dilemma of employing a
surrogate for race in the admission process. When students were separated by SES group, using self-
reported measures of SES, the data showed that the lowest SES students within each ethnic group reported
the lowest LSAT scores. One consequence of applying sufficient weight to SES to change the predicted
admission decision for some students is that the students who would be admitted under an SES-weighted
model would have LSAT scores and UGPAs that are statistically significantly lower than the scores and
grades of other students in the same ethnic group who would not be admitted. This practice would have
the effect both of admitting students of higher academic risk and of widening the gap in academic
preparation between admitted white students and admitted students of color.").
185 See Greenberg, supra note 153, at 552 (explaining that under UCLA's SES diversity program,
"while high-SES blacks had been eligible for affirmative action consideration, they are not eligible under
the new program because they do not receive credit for suffering from disadvantage").
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[A] large majority of blacks from families with high SES (superior
economic, educational, and other indicia of status) were deemed too
well-off to be eligible for affirmative action and not admitted. At the
same time, black students from disadvantaged families did not have
scores high enough to be admitted and were too low in SES for the
socio-economic supplement to put them over the top.
86
If we adjust the definition of low SES status to capture more of the
African American students with higher LSAT scores, then the pool of
eligible Anglos will expand significantly. 87  Sander notes that: "[the]
tradeoff between socioeconomic preference and academic ones is
characterized by diminishing returns. As the size of the 'class' preference
increases, the bonus in either economic or racial diversity declines as the
academic cost grows.' '188  He continues, "the reasons for this are logically
self-evident: students who are relatively needy but have relatively high
scores are the easiest to pick up in a system of preferences; as the preference
intensifies, it expands to those who are less needy and to those with weaker
credentials."'189  He concludes that "SES preferences are quite difficult to
justify on a purely racial rationale." 190
186 Id.
187 See Sander, supra note 181, at 501-02 ("The subtle argument, which Malamud develops
brilliantly, is this: the more broadly one defines a class of SES-disadvantaged people, the less inclusive of
racial minorities (especially blacks) it becomes. Since there are only a handful of truly deprived people in
the applicant pool of most law schools, the administrators of an SES system will be sorely tempted to
create much broader criteria for preferences, which will dilute the presence not only of minorities, but of
the most disadvantaged applicants.").
188 Id. at 498.
189 Id.
190 Id. at 503. Greenburg further explains:
We have also demonstrated something that we intuitively knew from the start: a class-
based system is not a fungible substitute for a race-based system. Each type of system
produces diversity, but the diversities do not duplicate one another; they merely overlap.
The extent of an existing racial preference, the size of the new SES preference and the
relative socioeconomic levels of different races, determine the extent of the overlap. In
the law school admissions context, blacks generally receive race-based preferences
equal to a standard deviation on the LSAT. Since, in our admissions pool, the black
SES divergence from whites is generally smaller than this, an SES preference cannot
fully offset a racial one, regardless of the size of the SES preference. Latinos generally
receive race-based preferences equal to one-half a standard deviation; since this is
comparable to their SES divergence from whites, an SES preference can offset the racial
one, though much less efficiently (e.g. with a lower academic threshold and the
admission of many non-Latinos).
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More Asian and Anglo students from that same low SES background
have adequate scores to be considered.' 9' Most of the African Americans
with competitive scores for a school such as UCLA School of Law are from
middle class families, and thus would not qualify for the low SES boost.
92
Of course, as one considers schools lower in the U.S. News rankings, these
numbers change somewhat, but the vast majority of low SES students remain
Anglo at any qualification level. And the vast majority of Anglos outscore
the average African American or Latino on the LSAT.
As we have learned from previous diversity experiments at UCLA
School of Law (socio-economic and diversity of public service vocations),
we can expect that this diversity program would increase diversity in the
ways that are considered by the selection committee. If race and ethnicity
are not considered, then racial or ethnic diversity will not increase in any
significant way through this type of diversity scholarship program. As the
experiment with socio-economic diversity demonstrated after the end of
affirmative action in California public law schools, racial and ethnic diversity
cannot be maintained, let alone increased, when socio-economic status is the
main consideration. UCLA was able to significantly increase the number of
students who were poor or the first in their family to attend college or law
school, which are both laudable achievements, but most of those students
were Anglo. 1
93
2. Other Race Neutral Factors to Consider
Are there other factors that should be considered in a race-neutral
diversity scholarship program that would be effective in selecting students
from a variety of racial and ethnic backgrounds? If fluency in any second
language (as opposed to the more "cultured" or high status languages) was a
factor, that would add points for many Asian Americans and Latinos.
Anglos would be as likely, or more likely, to possess this skill than African
Americans, and thus this factor would not increase African American
diversity levels. Athletic abilities may be an effective factor for awarding
191 Id. at 498.
192 See Kidder, supra note 115, at 183 (acknowledging Rick Sander's data on the SES admissions
program and stating that Sander "reports that the median parental income of applicants was $38,000 for
Blacks, $31,000 for Latinos, and $64,000 for Whites. Among the top 1,000 applicants (based on
LSATJUGPA index scores) the racial income gaps increased: Blacks $40,000, Latinos $44,000 and
Whites $79,000. Thus, among top performers, Whites have almost double [sic] the parental income of
Blacks."). This data suggests that the SES correlation with race contributes to the overprediction vis-a-vis
minority applicants of lower SES status.
193 Sander, supra note 181, at 488, 501.
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points to African American students at levels higher than those of Asian
Americans, Latinos and Anglos (depending on the sport, of course) at the
undergraduate level but would be difficult to justify in law schools and other
graduate program admissions. Overcoming obstacles may be a factor that
weighs more heavily for applicants of color, though the obstacle of poverty is
a substantial one and one that many Anglos also share. While all of these
factors may provide some additional points to some diversity applicants, it is
unlikely that any one will have a substantial impact on racial and ethnic
diversity. As the University of Michigan argued in their Grutter briefs, other
methods of maintaining academic excellence and a diverse student body
were ineffective. 1
94
What about a reverse grandfather clause? Perhaps the following
standard should be used: if an applicant's grandparents would not have been
eligible to enroll in the school due to their race or ethnicity, then that school
could decide that the applicant is eligible for a scholarship if he or she is
admitted and chooses to enroll. Schools would need to determine whether to
require that all four grandparents have been ineligible, or a lesser number
like two or three. Using this criterion would take into account a variety of
factors, such as race and gender, as well as wealth and access to education
issues. Then, schools truly would be helping those who started without the
benefit of wealthy educated grandparents, which in turns leads to wealthy
educated parents. If eligibility were based on parental ability to enroll, the
effectiveness of the policy would be compromised, simply because more
schools have changed their policies and become less overtly discriminatory
towards underrepresented groups in the last generation.
The reverse grandfather clause also would have the effect of being
neither over-inclusive nor under-inclusive by limiting its purview to those
who lived in the United States before and during the civil rights era of the
1960s and excluding those who immigrated to the United States after that
time. This clause would not be explicitly race-based, nor even race-
conscious, and thus may be effective for African Americans and Latinos as
well as for Asian ethnicities (though not, perhaps, the least disadvantaged,
such as the Vietnamese and other South East Asians, who immigrated here in
larger numbers at a later time). We would need to examine the effects of this
policy on the Jewish population, depending upon whether the Jewish quotas
were lifted in higher education before or after current grandparents would
have sought enrollment.
194 University of Michigan Brief, supra note 82, at 68-76.
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3. Incorporating International Students Into the Diversity Equation
Using international students to increase diversity would be another
race-neutral route. However, there is an issue that some scholars have raised
as to whether international students and recent immigrants should "count" for
diversity purposes. Some of the diversity that we experience in elite
educational institutions comes from students of color who were born or grew
up in other nations around the globe. Are black immigrants and their
children the new sort of "model minority" in the United States? Consider the
warm welcome of now Senator Barack Obama at the Democratic National
Convention.195  These international students may be from diverse
backgrounds and cultures, and therefore can contribute to the benefits that
flow from a diverse student body, such as helping to eradicate stereotypes
based on race. But are the costs of admitting these students over United
States citizens worth the benefits? The stereotypes based on national origin
(American Blacks versus African Blacks, for instance) would remain for
American-born blacks and descendants of those enslaved in the United
States. It is likely that the international blacks would begin to hear the
refrain familiar to so many educated African Americans: "You are not like
those other black people."
Moreover, the heavy use of international students may give us a false
sense of accomplishment in reducing the racial performance gaps. 196 Forde-
Mazrui explains that:
[D]iversity-based programs may create a false impression that
past discrimination is being addressed by benefiting blacks who
are not victims of past societal discrimination, such as recent
black immigrants. Such programs may thus close the black-
white gap with the wrong blacks, that is, with blacks who were
not harmed by past societal discrimination. The apparent
elimination of racial disparities could thus deceive us into
believing we have repaired the past when we have only obscured
it.
19 7
195 See Dyson, supra note 89, at 253-54.
196 Such admissions might also exacerbate the socio-economic gap that Professor Bell laments,
because international students generally are not provided with financial aid and therefore must have
sufficient economic means to pay for their own elite education.
197 See Kim Forde-Mazrui, Taking Conservatives, Seriously: A Moral Justification for
Affirmative Action and Reparations, 92 CAL. L. REV. 683, 750-51 (2004).
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The author recognizes, however, that remedying past discrimination
is a different goal than providing diversity, but the concerns about the false
sense of accomplishment still apply to the extent that one of the benefits of
diversity is helping to legitimize our elite institutions. 198 In response to
Justice Scalia's warning that minority groups will litigate each other over the
allocation of critical mass spaces, Dyson explains that for West Indian and
African immigrants, "their children, and the children of biracial couples
[represent] the largest portion of blacks admitted to the most selective
institutions of higher education." 199  Specifically Dyson notes: "Recent
research confirms that on average, West Indians account for more than forty-
one percent of all 'blacks' at twenty-eight selective institutions," including
Harvard, Columbia, Duke, Penn and UC Berkeley.2° Perhaps the reverse
grandfather clause suggestion discussed above would provide a partial
solution to this perceived dilemma.
4. Race Neutral Means are Ineffective
Now so we come to the rationale for the Grutter decision: because
race neutral means do not achieve the desired goal in the context of
admissions, the university is left with no choice but to employ race conscious
means of evaluating applicants. 20 1 This choice is a limited and limiting one
because it can only endure for a short time and only so long as it is necessary
to further the compelling interest (and perhaps according to some
interpretations of Grutter for no more than twenty-two more years,
regardless of its success or failure at that time). Spann explains that: "the
[Supreme] Court is now able to use the concept of prospective race neutrality
as a means of freezing existing racial inequalities in the distribution of
resources. And it is able to do so while purporting to advance the abstract
goal of racial equality.t
20 2
Prospective racial equality seems to be the end point for affirmative
action (the time when it is no longer needed) but even if racial equality never
is realized, the end will come nonetheless. Unfortunately, the persistence of
subtle and obvious Anglo privilege prevents the attainment of racial equality,
198 Id.
199 Dyson, supra note 89, at 253-54.
200 id.
201 See Grutter v. Bollinger, 539 U.S. 306, 328, 332 (2003) (noting that "[iln order to cultivate a
set of leaders with legitimacy in the eyes of the citizenry, it is necessary that the path to leadership be
visibly open to talented and qualified individuals of every race and ethnicity.").
mo Spann, supra note 171, at 249-50.
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at least under the current Supreme Court's interpretation of the matter. In the
meantime, Spann cautions:
There is no such thing as race neutral allocation. There is only the
pretense of race neutrality that occurs when we elect to use inertia as
our preferred form of racial discrimination. Which, [sic] of course, is
precisely what the Supreme Court has done by reading the Constitution
to prohibit the race-conscious pursuit of racial balance.
203
Because racial balance cannot be the goal, we must distinguish the
critical mass goal from racial balancing.
B. Turning to Race Consciousness: Avoiding the Quota Criticism and Racial
Balancing Allegations
If race neutrality is illusory, and racial balancing is impermissible,
how can diversity lawfully be increased? It seems that a focus on critical
mass and under-representation actually propagates an illegal quota, or
impermissible "racial balancing" by evaluating when a group has reached its
ceiling for representation, and thereafter cutting off any preferential
treatment for that group. Individuals will be judged based on their
membership in the group, and not based on their individual merits and value,
and thus the equal protection clause will be violated.
However, convincing this argument may be, the Grutter majority
opinion supports a contrary view. The Grutter Court reasoned that a
concentration on critical mass is not the same as a quota, because it is a
flexible number, not an absolute constant that must be achieved and
maintained from year to year without regard to any annual variations in the
quality of the applicant pool.2°4 The Grutter Court relied heavily upon the
historical fact that "the number of underrepresented minority students who
ultimately enroll in the Law School differs substantially from their
representation in the applicant pool and varies considerably for each group
from year to year., 205 Thus, as long as the critical mass of students in each
203 Id. at 241.
204 See Grutter, 539 U.S. at 335-36 (2003) ("The Law School's goal of attaining a critical mass of
underrepresented minority students does not transform its program into a quota. As the Harvard plan
described by Justice Powell recognized, there is of course 'some relationship between numbers and
achieving the benefits to be derived from a diverse student body, and between numbers and providing a
reasonable environment for those students admitted.' (citations omitted) 'Some attention to numbers'
without more, does not transform a flexible admissions system into a rigid quota.").
205 id. at 336.
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group is flexible and not an absolute number, the program would not
constitute an impermissible use of quotas.
The Grutter Court also recognized the limitations of "racial
balancing," 5determining that while outright racial balancing was
impermissible, pursuing a flexible critical mass of diverse races and
ethnicities would be acceptable. 206  The Supreme Court granted certiorari to
review the issue of racial balancing in the Seattle Schools and Jefferson
County cases, °7 addressing this question:
May a school district that is not racially segregated and that normally
permits a student to attend any high school of her choosing deny a child
admission to her chosen school solely because of her race in an effort to
achieve a desired racial balance in particular schools, or does such
racial balancing violate the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth
Amendment?2
°8
As this article was in the final editing stages, the Court issued its
opinion, reaffirming the view that racial balancing is not permissible, and
striking down the programs as insufficiently narrowly tailored, specifically
because race neutral alternatives were not adequately considered. 209
One issue presented in this Seattle Schools litigation is that the
multitude of races and ethnicities is grouped together rather cavalierly. 210 if
each race were identified more specifically, then the opposition likely would
label the program an impermissible quota. But the situation is not a binary
one and should not be treated as such. Yet, the First Circuit case referenced
206 Id. at 309.
207 Parents Involved in Cmty. Sch. v. Seattle Sch. Dist. No. 1, 426 F.3d 1162 (Wash. 2005), cert.
granted, 126 S. Ct. 2351 (2006), rev'd, 127 S. Ct. 2738 (2007) argued in tandem with Meredith v.
Jefferson County Bd. of Educ., cert. granted, 126 S. Ct. 2351 (2006), rev'd, 127 S. Ct. 2738 (2007).
208 Parents Involved in Cmty. Sch. v. Seattle Sch. Dist. No. 1, 127 S.Ct. 2738 (2007). See Petition
for Writ of Certiorari, Parents, 126 S. Ct. 2351 (No. 05-908) (explaining that there is a split of authority on
the issue of racial balancing in the circuit courts, and that is likely one reason why the petition was
granted); but see Brief in Opposition, Parents, WL 789611, 14 (2006) (arguing that there is "no circuit
conflict or confusion," and cautions that "to the extent that the circuit courts continue to refine the
application of the Michigan cases in the highly fact-specific context of K-12 school assignment plans,
granting review without the benefit of a record that reflects current trends in this dynamic area of
educational policy would not be helpful to the orderly development of the law"). The reply brief states
that "[A]s this court said in Grutter, this is nothing more than 'racial balancing, which is patently
unconstitutional."' Id. (citing Grutter v. Bollinger, 539 U.S. 306, 330 (2003)). Upon checking that quote
in the text of the Grutter case, however, the "this" actually refers to "some specified percentage of a
particular group merely because of its race or ethnicity. That would amount to outright racial balancing,
which is patently unconstitutional." Grutter, 539 U.S. at 330. The quote continues: "Rather, critical
mass is defined by reference to the educational benefits that diversity is designed to produce" (not to be
achieved for its own sake). Id.
209 Parents, 127 S. Ct. 2738.
210 Parents, 426 F.3d at 1170.
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as part of the conflict in authority, suggests that the lumping together of the
various minority races and ethnicities is appropriate because "narrow
tailoring does not require that Lynn [the school district] ensure diversity
among every racial and ethnic subgroup as well. ''21' The First Circuit's
interpretation is that the critical mass refers to the sum of all of the
underrepresented racial and ethnic groups.212
The Comfort court explained that "[w]here a community does not
seek racial diversity for its own sake, but rather to advance a compelling
interest in the educational benefits that diversity provides, there is no
absolute bar to pursuing racial diversity., 213 The court also found that the
Lynn school plan "takes race into account to foster intergroup [sic] contact
rather than to segregate.' 2 4  In addition, the Circuit court reiterated the
district court's determination that:
[T]he Lynn Plan validates this conclusion: by reducing racial isolation
and increasing intergroup [sic] contact, it has ameliorated racial and
ethnic tension and bred interracial tolerance .... We therefore see no
reason to impose a blanket prohibition on the use of race as a decisive
factor in a student transfer plan to further a compelling interest in
obtaining the educational benefits of racial diversity. If a non-
competitive, voluntary student transfer plan is otherwise narrowly
tailored, individualized consideration of each student is unnecessary. 215
It would appear that this First Circuit authority provides the most
compelling argument that the narrowly tailoring factors are indeed that-
factors, which are weighed and balanced against one another, and are not
elements, each of which must be satisfied to satisfy strict scrutiny review.
The Comfort court may have been somewhat bold in asserting that
individualized review is not necessary, but such a departure is reasonable
given the substantial differences between selection for admission to the
highly competitive elite universities and the open choice system for non-
competitive secondary and elementary schools. This different conception of
what is sufficiently narrowly tailored at the lower educational levels provides
211 Comfort v. Lynn Sch. Dist., 418 F.3d 1, 22 (lst Cir. 2005) (citations omitted) (noting that the
law school sought to enroll a critical mass of 'minority' students, a category that included African-
Americans, Hispanics, and Native Americans), cert. denied, 126 S. Ct. 798 (2005).
212 Comfort, 418 F.3d at 22.
213 Id. at 15 (1st Cir. 2005) (citing Grutter, 539 U.S. at 330).
214 Id. at 19.
215 Id. (internal citations omitted). In evaluating the narrowly tailoring aspect, the court also found
that "the diminished nature of any harm here is significant." Id. at 20.
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a useful analogy to the financial aid process. Students seeking financial
assistance already have been through the highly competitive admissions
process, and thus the rules can be more relaxed for the allocation of financial
aid to those already admitted students, much as the rules can be more relaxed
for the assigning of admissions slots in non-competitive elementary and
secondary school districts where every student is assured a spot in the
classroom.
If the only real option is a race-conscious allocation of financial aid,
then we must consider Factor Two: whether a less extensive or intrusive use
of race would be ineffective?
C. Factor Two: Whether a Less Extensive or Intrusive Use of Race Would
Be Ineffective
To focus more specifically on achieving and maintaining racial and
ethnic diversity, as a subset of the Diversity Scholarships, the universities
also should offer "Critical Mass Scholarships." These scholarships would be
a less intrusive and less extensive manner of taking race into account,
because the majority of diversity scholarships would be based on race neutral
factors, and therefore could fulfill Factor One, discussed above, by having
some success in the other ways of diversifying the student body. Because
the Grutter Court's discussion of the concept of critical mass referred to
racial and ethnic diversity, those characteristics would be the primary focus
of the Critical Mass Scholarships. This small subset of the Diversity
Scholarships would involve race-conscious consideration, and thus must be a
narrowly tailored means of achieving the compelling interest in student body
diversity or the benefits that flow from student body diversity.216  Our
examination of the requirements for narrowly tailoring under Grutter would
be applied to the scholarship program, and as long as the concept of stare
decisis holds, the scholarship program also should pass the Grutter version
of strict scrutiny analysis.
217
The Grutter analysis requires individualized review, and the Gratz
ruling demonstrates the illegitimacy of a mechanistic formula, which fit quite
well under this second factor about the extensiveness and intrusiveness of the
use of race.218 The mechanistic formula is the epitome of an extensive use of
race (as discussed in Gratz where an automatic twenty points was awarded
216 See generally, Chris Chambers Goodman, A Modest Proposal in Deference to Diversity, NAT'
L BLACK L. J. (forthcoming Spring 2006).
217 DOE Guidelines, supra note 121,
218 See Gratz v. Bollinger, 539 U.S. 244, 246 (2003) (explaining the importance of considering
each particular applicant as an individual).
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for everyone who identified as a member of an underrepresented racial or
ethnic minority group).2 19 The individualized review, which awarded points
based on a combination of diversity and other merit factors, was deemed to
be less extensive and less intrusive, while still being effective.22°
The U.S. Supreme Court roster has changed in the three years since
Grutter and Gratz, and therefore if a race-conscious financial aid program
was granted certiorari, the Court might follow reasoning other than that
explained in the majority opinions, on the grounds that stare decisis is not
implicated because of the differences between admissions and financial aid
issues. If the Court notes this distinction, then the argument that the
scholarship aid is sufficiently narrowly tailored to satisfy the strict scrutiny
test is a stronger one than in the admissions context.
Financial aid decisions differ from admissions decisions in an
important way, which renders the fit between the means used and the
compelling goal as much closer with the Critical Mass Scholarships than it
was with "race as a plus factor" admissions. Admitting a diverse group of
students is only the first step towards achieving student body diversity in a
given year. The other steps include: convincing a diverse group of students
to accept the admission offer; encouraging that group of students to actually
enroll and attend the school so that there is a critical mass; and ensuring that
those students participate in the learning community and continue to
participate through the years, so that the benefits that flow from diversity can
be enjoyed by all. Other steps that may or may not be included in a
particular university's diversity goal are: ensuring that those students
succeed and graduate at rates similar to other students. Nevertheless,
admitting diverse students does not guarantee a diverse class, though it is a
necessary first step.
On the other hand, the financial aid awards are linked directly to the
goal of obtaining a critical mass. Money is awarded to ensure that the
students needed to satisfy that critical mass are able to afford to attend, as
well as to entice them to attend. One commentator suggests a "diversity of
perspective statement" for review by the financial aid committee that would
award diversity scholarships. 221 "Seen this way," Dyson explains, "financial
aid is only a conduit by which to reinforce admissions offers that in turn
maybe designed to attract and recruit a critical mass of diversity. '" 222 Dyson
219 id.
220 Grutter v. Bollinger, 539 U.S. 306, 309 (2003).
221 Dyson, supra note 89, at 252.
222 Id.
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summarizes the proper way to evaluate narrow tailoring as follows: "by
taking account of all relevant diversifying factors, including ethnicity,
national origin, and color in an individualized and competitive process in
both the admissions and financial aid decisions.
223
If the student accepts the Critical Mass Scholarship and enrolls in the
university, then the school is one step closer to filling its critical mass goal
for that group of students. If the student declines to enroll, then the Critical
Mass Scholarship is not awarded to that student, and the money is saved for
someone who has what the university values at that stage in the enrollment
process-a characteristic which the university still lacks in its critical mass
calculations.
D. Factor Three: Whether the Use of Race or National Origin is of Limited
Extent and Duration and is Applied in a Flexible Manner
As discussed above, the Critical Mass Scholarships would use race
and ethnicity only for a subset of the Diversity Scholarships and only to the
extent necessary to obtain a diverse entering class. In each admissions cycle,
the committee can monitor the levels of racial and ethnic diversity being
obtained through the general diversity scholarships and can use that
information to determine the extent to which Critical Mass Scholarships need
to be offered, and to which groups. If one racial or ethnic group is
adequately represented in the critical mass equation through the main
diversity process, then there is no need to engage in the race conscious
consideration of the critical mass program for members of that group given
that the goal of the Critical Mass Scholarship component of the diversity
program is to enroll a critical mass of students from otherwise
underrepresented racial and ethnic groups and to avoid the problems of
tokenism and racial isolation that come from too little diversity.
223 Id. at 256-57. Dyson then evaluates three proposals for race conscious aid: (1) "race plus
considerations in a holistic race-conscious allocation determination of financial aid"; (2) "[alllocating
race-based financial aid directly from university funding while maintaining a race-conscious admission
process under Grutter and Gratz"; and (3) "[a]dministering race-based financial aid by selecting recipients
for private donor, race-restricted grants while maintaining a race-conscious admissions process under
Grutter." Id. at 258-59. Ultimately, Dyson concludes that the first option is the "one most likely to be
endorsed by the courts." Id. Nevertheless, Dyson finds that the third option can be analogized to
establishment clause cases, which did not find sufficient administration by the public entity to violate the
establishment clause, and she suggests that universities avoid "burdensome, pervasive monitoring," such
as interviewing candidates, checking on recipients' grades and other administrative pursuits. id. at 269.
Bednark also provides an analysis of religion-conscious scholarships, and determines that they can survive
strict scrutiny by passing the Establishment Clause analysis, when a race-conscious scholarship (as
opposed to all forms of diversity scholarship, including race and ethnicity) would not satisfy the strict
scrutiny test of the Equal Protection Clause. Bednark, supra note 163, at 1435-36.
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The limited duration of the Critical Mass Scholarship awards also is
narrowly tailored. The scholarships are given to particular students who
fulfill critical mass needs, for the year, or for the length of time that those
students continue to fulfill critical mass needs at that particular university.
Thus, if the university surpasses its critical mass range for Japanese
American students, for instance, then obtaining additional Japanese
American students would be of less value in the diversity analysis in that
particular year. Therefore, the university would cut back or curtail any
critical mass scholarship awards to Japanese American students. If in
subsequent years, the university finds Japanese American students
numbering below their critical mass range, the scholarship offers can be
resumed to encourage greater enrollment. When the university is able, on a
continuing basis, to achieve its critical mass range of Japanese American
students with decreasing Critical Mass Scholarships' dollars, then the awards
can be suspended, until the need arises in the future. Those monies can then
be allocated to other groups for which the university has yet to achieve a
critical mass.
The flexibility of the Critical Mass Scholarships is another important
feature that permits universities to narrowly tailor the program to satisfy their
diversity goals. For instance, if several African American students are
thinking of dropping out of the school because the demands of working part-
time while studying is having an adverse affect on their grades (a common
reason for student attrition), and losing those three or four students would
leave only one or two African American students to endure the concomitant
racial isolation, the school can choose to offer additional Critical Mass
Scholarship aid to those several students, so they no longer need to work for
a semester or year, and thus can stay in school. Having those students
remain in school adds value to the educational experience in at least two
ways: (1) the students themselves will be able to participate in keeping up
the critical mass, so that the true benefits can flow from diversity in that
regard; (2) the students who otherwise would be left almost alone, and might
themselves have considered leaving so as not to be "tokens," will be able to
benefit from continuing their education in a less isolated environment.
As the school is able to exceed its critical mass range for students of
one particular race or ethnicity, it can curtail the Critical Mass Scholarships
to members of that group and move the money into scholarships for groups
that are now underrepresented in an effort to increase diversity to its optimal
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levels. This adjustment is not impermissible racial balancing, based on
Grutter's analysis; instead, it constitutes a proper focus on critical mass. z2 4
The flexibility of this Critical Mass Scholarship program also avoids
two other fatal flaws of many other diversity programs: under-inclusiveness
and over-inclusiveness. The program struck down in Podberesky was over-
inclusive because while its stated goal was to remedy past discrimination
against high achieving African Americans by the university, there was no
evidence that the school had discriminated against these particular high
achieving African Americans in the past, nor that African Americans from
outside the state of Maryland had been victims of past discrimination by this
particular university. In addition, the Banekar scholarship program was
under-inclusive for two reasons: First, it was not available to other groups
who had been discriminated against by the university in the past.225 Second,
it did not necessarily result in an increase in the education of Maryland
residents because out of state African Americans also were eligible for the
scholarship.226
In contrast, the Critical Mass Scholarship program envisioned here
would not suffer from under-inclusiveness. The money would be available
to all those qualified and admitted students who provided value to the
university by meeting a critical mass need of the university. While the
financial resources may be limited, it is not likely that the court would find
budget limitations to constitute under-inclusiveness, based on the guidance
from admissions decisions, in which there are a limited number of
admissions slots to award. The Critical Mass Scholarship also would not be
over-inclusive because only qualified admitted students who added value by
meeting a current critical mass need of the university would be offered the
aid.227 Any student who stopped fulfilling that need would stop receiving the
aid.
224 See supra notes 167-74 and accompanying text on racial balancing (explaining that while
racial balancing is impermissible, pursuing a flexible critical mass of diverse races and ethnicities would
be acceptable).
225 Podberesky v. Kirwan, 38 F.3d 147, 153 (4th Cir. 1994).
226 Id. at 158 n. l1.
227 There is an argument that the benefit of the aid to the student continues for a lifetime, because
that is some amount less money that must be repaid through loans for the benefit of that educational
experience. In that sense, the award could be slightly over-inclusive, as continuing to benefit those who
no longer add value to the critical mass, but I think such an argument is not likely to succeed in
overturning the program.
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E. Factor Four: Whether the Institution Regularly Re-examines the Use of
Race or National Origin in Awarding Financial Aid to Determine Whether It
Is Still Necessary to Achieve Its Goal
As students enroll, graduate or leave the university, the requirements
for maintaining a critical mass of various groups will adjust with each
admissions cycle. Universities will necessarily re-evaluate the Critical Mass
Scholarship goals each year to determine what money should be directed at
which groups. The efficacy of the program also is a factor in the narrowly
tailored analysis, and it is easy to determine whether the Critical Mass
Scholarships are working to obtain a critical mass of diverse students by
noting the achievement of critical mass ranges when the scholarships are
awarded. If the scholarship awards turn out to be insufficient to ensure or
entice sufficient numbers of students of a particular race or ethnicity, then the
dollar amounts can be adjusted. If that adjustment does not accomplish the
goal, then the university can research other mechanisms for enrolling
students from that particular group.
On the other hand, as the scholarships attract more students from the
underrepresented group, and as the critical mass grows, the university may
become more attractive to students from this group, such that less financial
enticement will be needed in future years. Then, the university can lessen
the amount of these race-conscious financial aid awards for members of that
group and focus the money on groups for which a critical mass still is
lacking.
F. Factor Five: Whether the Effective Use of Race or National Origin on
Students Who Are Not Beneficiaries Of That Use Is Sufficiently Small and
Diffuse So As To Not Create An Undue Burden On Their Opportunity to
Receive Financial Aid
The explanations of the DOE Policy Guidance show that the burden
on students who do not qualify for race-based financial aid must be
minimized.228 The commentary states:
Generally, the less severe and more diffuse the impact on non-minority
students, the more likely a classification based on race or national
228 See DOE Guidelines, supra note 121, at 8762 (advising on the Civil Rights Act of 1964 and
related regulations and their applicability to those financial aid awards at least partially based on race or
national origin).
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origin will address this factor satisfactorily. However, it is not
necessary to show that no student's opportunity to receive financial aid
has been in any way diminished by the use of the race-targeted aid.
Rather the use of race-targeted financial aid must not place an undue
burden on students who are not eligible for that aid.229
Financial aid decisions do not place an "undue burden" on the non
beneficiaries (here, the non-recipients of aid, or those who receive less aid
than they would like) because the invitation to enroll already has been
extended, and thus the applicant has the ability to attend the school, as long
as he or she can work out the finances.
This is not to belittle the critical importance of financial aid in
helping students from middle and lower SES backgrounds to attend
expensive colleges and universities. If the student is from a lower SES
background, the money can be obtained from the federal government through
grants and loans. Dyson explains that the allocation of race-based
scholarships may have a lesser burden on non-qualifying Anglos when
federal financial aid funds are available to students who do not receive race-
based funding.230 Any federal funding would have been reduced by the
amount of the race-based scholarship if they had been eligible. Thus, the
students are as able to get their financial needs met, whether or not they
qualify for race-based aid.
In addition, the critical mass fund does not take money away from
students who do not satisfy a critical mass need. When an admitted applicant
requires financial assistance to attend the university, the committee will
determine whether that individual helps to fulfill a diversity need. If so, then
that student will be considered for the diversity-based financial aid, which is
available to students of all races and ethnicities. If the student fills a current
critical mass need, that student can be offered funds from the race-conscious
funds. If the student does not meet ether of these needs, she will be offered
funding from the need-based category.
This three-step decision process even more narrowly tailors the
program to accomplish the goal of diversity and achieving critical masses
where applicable. It does not section off special funds each year for
"minorities only," and thus would not fall victim to the Bakke23t dilemma of
229 Id.
230 See Dyson, supra note 89, at 260-61 (finding that university financial aid offsets the difference
between students receiving federal funds and those who are not).
231 See Regents of Univ. of Cal. v. Bakke, 438 U.S. 265 (1978) (finding that the school's system
of reserving places for disadvantaged applicants in the entering class was unconstitutional; however, race
can be taken into account as one factor in the admissions process).
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segregated selection pools. Instead, those dollars that were donated for race-
conscious aid will be available to a particular student who meets a need in a
particular year. If no student meets the critical mass and diversity needs in a
particular year, then no money would be awarded from that particular fund
that year. The university will not need to allocate the funds to an unqualified
applicant to maintain diversity, and the money will not be taken away from
an admitted student who does not satisfy the critical mass needs that year.
In determining whether the student needs financial assistance to
enroll, this article suggests a more flexible approach to financial aid
decisions instead of applying a mechanistic need-based formula that so many
schools currently rely upon. Differences in wealth and net worth between
the families of students of color and Anglo-Saxon students can be
substantial, but the current financial aid calculations seem to rely most upon
current and immediately past family income. Two families with current
income of $200,000 may look the same in terms of current ability to
contribute to a child's college education, but if one family owns three homes
(and their mortgages are paid off), and another family rents its home and
leases its vehicles, there is a substantial difference in these two families'
232current ability to pay a child's college tuition. Thus, flexible diversity and
Critical Mass Scholarship Programs could take factors like wealth and net
worth into consideration more readily to determine whether a particular
student actually needs additional financial assistance to be able to enroll and
remain in school. The flexibility of this approach likely will result in more,
or higher, financial aid awards to students who are otherwise considered
middle or upper-middle class, yet are unable to attend the schools of their
choice due to inadequate need-based awards under the current system most
widely applied.
If the student is from a middle class or upper-middle class
background, then some parental or student contribution may be required even
under this new system, but the goal is to ensure that the amount is not
daunting. If the student does not receive a diversity or critical mass financial
aid award, still there are need-based funds, as well as private lending
opportunities and student employment to help bridge the gap. The ultimate
benefit of a college or graduate school education is not denied to the
232 See Kidder, supra note 115, at 184-85 (describing the differences between black families and
white families in regard to wealth accumulation, being that white families have a far greater
accumulation).
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qualified student who is offered admission but not offered sufficient
scholarship aid from the institution itself.
233
This burden of receiving financial assistance from a different source
is distinguishable from the burden in the admission context in which the
student is precluded from attending an institution to which she was not
admitted (at least for the time being, unless a subsequent application is
successful in another enrollment cycle). While the Grutter Court did not
consider that denial to be an undue burden in the admissions cycle,234 the
current Court may draw the line differently. Nonetheless, this financial aid
burden is much lower, and farther from an "undue" burden in the financial
context.
G. Will This Scholarship Program Provide Adequate Individualized
Consideration?
Individualized review was a cornerstone of the admissions process in
the Grutter and Gratz cases, 235 and it is likely that the current United States
Supreme Court would expect the same individualized review for race-
conscious financial aid decisions. The perceived lack of individual
consideration is a public relations issue as well when the Anglo-Saxons see
themselves as "displaced" by less qualified applicants of color. Goodwin Lui
explains that the public relations problem is based on a false premise because
"the admission of minority applicants and the rejection of white applicants
are largely independent events, improperly linked through the causation
fallacy." 236
233 When the financial aid award is small, the amount of loans necessary may appear
overwhelming, and "some schools argue that admitting a student and then telling them the school doesn't
have the money to fund them is no different than denying them. They argue that they don't want to put
the family through the false hope of being able to attend. NAIS would argue that honesty is the best
policy; if the student is qualified to be admitted, he/she should know that. If the school cannot give them
the aid they need, the family should know that as well. Then the family can decide if they can or cannot
gather the resources to pay tuition. Otherwise, if a child is denied admission because the school cannot
(or chooses not to) fund them, he/she is not likely to know that this is the reason and may feel they just
weren't 'good enough' to get in." Mark J. Mitchell, Developing a Need-Blind Approach to Admission (on
file with author).
2M See Grutter, 539 U.S. at 341 (finding that the university's admission process included
acceptance of non-minority applicants over minority applicants when the non-minority applicants would
better assist the university in its goal of a diverse environment).
235 See generally, Section D. The Narrowly Tailoring Factors Post-Grutter.
236 Goodwin Lu, The Causation Fallacy: Bakke and the Basic Arithmetic of Selective Admissions,
100 MICH. L. REV. 1045, 1049 (2002). Lu summarizes his argument as follows: "My argument proceeds
from one simple statistical truth: In any admissions process where applicants greatly outnumber admittees,
and where white applicants greatly outnumber minority applicants, substantial preferences for minority
applicants will not significantly diminish the odds of admission facing white applicants." Id. at 1049. Lu
also notes:
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Lui suggests that shifting the focus of harm to whites away from
"displacement" (because most whites would not have their admissions
chances increased in any significant way if all affirmative action were halted)
and toward avoiding stereotyping would be a more positive way to evaluate
the efficacy of diversity programs that consider race as well as other
factors.237  Lui states that: "the key point is that the grievances of white
applicants cannot be meaningfully evaluated through a generalized balancing
of tangible costs and benefits. What is required is a nuanced examination of
how a particular affirmative action policy operates and how its operation
does or does not accord each applicant equal dignity."
238
Under the Critical Mass Scholarship Program, financial aid will be
awarded based on individual value-how an individual student is able to add
value to the educational institution by helping to satisfy a critical mass goal.
Applicants are not interchangeable in this equation. Anglo-Saxon applicants
also have the ability to fulfill diversity goals, and therefore are not displaced
as a group from the diversity financial aid program. The numerous
components of diversity will ensure that each student has something to offer
in terms of diversity, regardless of her race or ethnicity. This reality may in
time help to lessen the stereotyping associated with diversity in general and
critical mass allocations in particular.
When the mechanics of selective admissions are analyzed at the level of individual
applicants, it becomes clear that a substantial number of unsuccessful white applicants
(somewhere close to half in Bowen and Bok's study) are too weak to be admitted even
when placed on an equal footing with minority applicants. Because the failure of those
[displaced white] applicants to gain admission has nothing to do with race, they lack
standing to challenge affirmative action.
Id. at 1050. He further states:
Because strict scrutiny takes into account the nature and severity of the burden that
affirmative action imposes on white applicants, it is essential to characterize that burden
accurately, without the distorting influence of the causation fallacy. Moreover,
exposing the causation fallacy has the salutary effect of centering the merits inquiry on
whether white applicants are improperly stereotyped, not displaced, by affirmative
action. Claims of displacement tend to inflate the degree of racial conflict inherent in
race-conscious admissions, thereby heightening the pressure to be 'for' or 'against'
affirmative action. In contrast, the stereotyping concern defuses the tendency toward
polarization by relating the fairness of affirmative action to the concrete workings of
particular policies.
Id.
237 Id. at 1101-02.
238 Id. at 1102.
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V. Conclusion
The traditional notion of merit as a requisite for financial assistance
like scholarships diminishes diversity, particularly racial and ethnic diversity
in higher education. Moreover, a traditional merit-based system is not
supported by the principles of justice, because rational actors who do not
know how meritorious they will be would be unlikely to choose merit as the
criteria for financial aid from behind the veil of ignorance. For these
reasons, our traditional merit system does not provide the fairest allocation of
educational assistance and resources.
The two corollaries that this article draws from Rawls arise from
Rawls' original position, beneath the veil of ignorance, and they are likely to
satisfy rational actors in that position. Financial equality of opportunity
would be more important to rational actors in the original position, and
therefore a need-based rule, to provide financial assistance to those who need
it, would be more likely to emerge. This first corollary is justified by Rawls'
principles of justice and explains one way to apply Rawls' theory to financial
aid. The Diversity Scholarship depends upon the first corollary by
recognizing that needs vary with culture, class, race and other circumstances,
and therefore provides a more relaxed mechanism for evaluating financial
need, to capture a larger share of diversity students.
Increasing representation for the underrepresented, the second
corollary, also emerges readily from the original position, as an a priori
determination that resources be allocated in a manner that gives everyone a
chance at obtaining some of those educational resources. The second
corollary also provides a justification for the Diversity Scholarships on the
grounds that increasing diversity helps to maximize the representation of
underrepresented groups. The Critical Mass component of the Diversity
Scholarship Program focuses on the second corollary, by providing an
effective method of achieving and maintaining racial and ethnic diversity
through lifting up the least among us, the least represented in a particular
institution of higher education. The need-based component of the first
corollary provides a crucial limitation on the Critical Mass Scholarship
Program, to ensure that the program remains narrowly tailored, not only by
providing assistance where it is needed to help increase representation of
underrepresented groups, but also by ceasing such assistance when the group
no longer is underrepresented in the diversity calculus.
This Article has demonstrated that the Diversity Scholarship
Program would not be subject to strict scrutiny to the extent that the program
is not race-based. The race-conscious portion of the program (the Critical
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Mass Scholarships) would survive strict scrutiny as a narrowly tailored way
to pursue the compelling interest in racial and ethnic diversity that Grutter
permits in institutions of higher education. The Critical Mass Scholarship
component satisfies existing federal law by meeting the narrow tailoring
factors of Grutter, Podberesky and the DOE Guidelines on financial aid to
pursue diversity. Furthermore, to the extent that some past or current
discrimination can be established, in the areas of merit, faculty offspring, and
alumnae scholarships, the Critical Mass Scholarships would provide a
narrowly tailored race-conscious remedy to that past (and continuing)
discrimination that would not violate Title VI funding limitations.
The two corollaries provide a mechanism for analyzing the fairness
of this and other diversity and Critical Mass Scholarship Programs. It is this
author's hope that while diversity remains a compelling interest, and the
court permits narrowly tailored means to achieve the goal of diversity,
institutions of higher education put forth their strongest efforts by providing
targeted financial resources to achieve the critical mass diversity that Grutter
lauds, while complying with the principles of justice and fundamental
fairness that Rawls espouses.

